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AbstrAct
This is a policy paper based on an overview of the national and international 
evidence of the harmful impacts of gambling and a critique of current 
approaches to gambling governance and regulation in Australia. Gambling is 
licensed and regulated at state level. State and Territory governments are heavily 
dependent on gambling taxes, and perhaps unsurprisingly, have shown little 
interest in implementing appropriate reforms to protect their citizens from 
gambling-related harms.
After two decades of exponential growth of the gambling industry in 
Australia, there is wide recognition of gambling-related harms and negative 
consequences for individuals, families and communities.  The Australian 
Productivity Commission (PC) reported on the industry in 1999 and again 
ten years later, in 2009. They released their draft final report, in October 2009; 
and their final report on July 23, 2010. While the Productivity Commission’s 
2010 report presents valuable data on gambling and makes some strident 
recommendations, it is not clear on the principles and governance system that 
should underpin a national public health and consumer protection approach to 
gambling – and its implementation. The Productivity Commission is strong on 
problem identification but weak on an integrated national regulatory approach 
to remedying the problems caused by gambling and the actions needed to 
address State Governments’ dependence on gambling taxes. Some of the PC 
recommendations such as legalising online poker games and exempting online 
gambling providers from bans on credit card use, lack an adequate evidence 
base and pose a grave risk to players.
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This paper critiques the prevailing addictions/informed choice model, which 
dominates current government and industry approaches to gambling policy. 
Constructing ‘the problem’ in terms of harm minimisation (as in the Productivity 
Commission’s terms of reference), side-steps the key issue of the mounting 
impact of gambling; and in particular, electronic gaming machines and casinos.
It is argued the Commonwealth needs to lead on an integrated National Action 
Plan on Gambling, that is squarely based on a risk and prevention strategy with 
new policies, institutions and financial incentives to the States and Territories. 
Essentially, the Commonwealth government needs to lead on gambling re-
regulation.
The proposed National Action Plan for Gambling Governance and Re-
Regulation outlined in this report is a whole-of-system public health approach 
that incorporates as crucial elements: national consumer protection product 
safety/regulation; national ‘license to operate’ venue responsibilities; industry 
obligations (host responsibility and duty of care); national regulatory oversight 
(data monitoring); independent research (integrity); evidence based policy; and 
national independent audit/monitoring of policy and venue-level interventions.
A reform agenda to wean the states off their reliance on gambling taxes needs 
to offer incentives. To fund these new initiatives we propose (i) a revenue-
neutral reform agenda funded from a new 2 percent ‘super-profits tax’ on the 
gambling industry and (ii) establishment of a new National Lottery Commission. 
In its final report, The Productivity Commission (2010, p. 2) recognises that 
properly regulated, lotteries are the least harmful form of gambling. In the short 
term, this fund would then be used to give incentives to the States/Territories 
(via the Commonwealth Grants Commission) to wind back their dependence 
on gambling taxes. In the longer term, a National Lottery Fund could finance 
heritage, parks, and other sustainability and community building initiatives. This 
paper has been written to inform public debate on a new direction for a national 
approach to gambling policy and calls on the Commonwealth to take over 
gambling regulation. 
>  l inda.hancock@deak in.edu.au
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Forward
As one who has been raising his voice about problem gambling for the best part of fifteen 
years, I would welcome being able to retire from this field. This report by Associate 
Professor Linda Hancock and Michael O’Neil gives me some hope of doing that.
The problem is well known.  The protagonists for gambling income being entrenched are well 
known.  They are twofold: state governments who depend on topping up consolidated revenue 
from the losses from all forms of gambling, and the captains of the gaming industry who have 
enjoyed massive profits from what are, after all, public licenses.
The antagonists are well known. We cannot ignore the election of South Australian MP Nick 
Xenophon to the Senate – with the highest number of votes of any independent in federal 
Parliamentary history – on a platform of no pokies.
What is not known is how to go beyond the rhetoric to a rational and appropriate reregulation 
of the gaming industry.
I had some say in the commissioning a Productivity Commission report in 1999.  My brother 
as Treasurer took that decision and the subsequent report was groundbreaking.  Apart from 
many extraordinary findings, perhaps the most breathtaking was that Australia had 20.4 per 
cent of all the world’s poker machines.  In addition, it uncovered that 42.3 per cent of every 
dollar going through a poker machine was coming from a problem gambler.
Despite these shocking revelations, nothing really changed in reregulating gambling in 
Australia. No national plan for gambling governance emerged.
In 2007, the previous Prime Minister Kevin Rudd upped the ante of rhetoric even beyond that 
of his predecessor John Howard, and emerged in pre-election campaigning to say that he 
“hates pokies”.
Now in 2010, we have seen another Productivity Commission report.  Some ten years on, we 
find borne out the same issues.  Indeed, we find a greater level of dependence by the states on 
gambling revenues, and little real action to deal with the social consequences.
The Federal government has shown determination to confront the states to push reform of the 
health sector.  It is now time for reforms to curb the destructive impacts of gambling, and to 
wean the States from their addiction to gambling industry revenue.
We remain a nation without a gambling governance plan.  This is why I commend the report 
by Linda Hancock and Michael O’Neil.  It gives me hope that one day I can retire from this 
topic.
Tim Costello, Melbourne 
CEO World Vision  
July 2010 
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Executive Summary
Introduction
Thousands of Australians gamble. Indeed, it is estimated that there is now one electronic 
gaming machine or poker machine for every 110 people in Australia, with Australia having 
the eighth-highest total number of gaming machines in the world2. Australians lose over $19 
billion a year on gambling; and conservatively, 40 per cent (and as high as 60 per cent) of this 
comes from problem gamblers (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 16).
What families and communities see as ‘problem gamblers’ the gambling industry sees as their 
best customers.  Indeed, research shows that regular gamblers contribute approximately 92 
per cent of poker machine revenue3; and Australian data confirms ‘the bulk of gaming revenue is 
from regular gamblers’ (Productivity Commission, 2010, Appendix C, p.20-21).
Australian communities have been vocal in their opposition to the growth of gambling.  For 
example a study undertaken by the Australian National University of the attitudes of 
Victorians in 2004 found that:
• 85 per cent of Victorians agreed that ‘Gambling is a serious social problem in 
Victoria;
• 90 per cent agreed that ‘the Victorian government should reduce the number of poker 
machines’;
• 76 per cent agreed that ‘gambling is too widely accessible in Victoria’;
• 74 per cent agreed that ‘the number of poker machines in Victoria should be 
reduced’4.
The adverse community impacts of gambling are now well-recognised and documented in 
terms of crime, family break up, financial ruin and bankruptcy, suicide and self harm.  Indeed, 
in the lead up to the 2007 election the then Opposition leader, Kevin Rudd, said:
I hate poker machines and I know something of their impact on families.
This is a matter of continued policy interest to me. I think the social impact 
is significant, hard to quantify but it's significant. It's of sufficient concern to 
me for this not to just drop off the radar5.
But despite the concerns of the previous Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, with poker machines, 
and despite the findings of the recent Productivity Commission inquiry which found that there 
are around 115,000 people categorised as ‘problem gamblers’ in Australia, and an additional 
estimated 280,000 at ‘moderate risk’6, the issue of problem gambling does indeed appear to 
have dropped off the Federal government agenda.
State governments are addicted to problem gamblers
The State and Territory governments are heavily dependent on gambling taxes, which we 
show now account for an average 10 per cent of their revenues and higher in States such as 
Victoria (13 per cent), South Australia (13 per cent) and Northern Territory (17 per cent).  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, State and Territory governments have shown little interest in 
adequately protecting their citizens from gambling-related harms.  Despite so-called ‘harm 
minimisation’ measures, gambling losses continue to rise.
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In recent times the Commonwealth government has shown itself willing to intervene in a wide 
range of areas that have historically been the preserve of the States including energy 
regulation, consumer protection and, most recently, health reform.  Given the apparent 
indifference of State and Territory governments, it seems clear that if substantial reforms 
aimed at protecting problem gamblers, their families and our communities from the harms of 
gambling are to be introduced, then those reforms will need to be led by the Commonwealth.
What needs to be done?
There are two main problems with the gambling industry in Australia.  The industry is under-
taxed and under-regulated. In order to transform the gambling industry into a recreational 
rather than the today’s clearly harmful activity, significant reforms need to be made.  Such 
reforms, if implemented, would raise significant amounts of revenue, reduce the enormous 
harm that gambling imposes on a significant percentage of the population and help build more 
resilient and inclusive communities. 
In short, Australia needs a new, tough independent gambling regulator and a National Action 
Plan for Gambling Governance and Re-Regulation, to wean States off their current reliance 
on gambling revenue. 
This is a policy paper based on a scoping of the evidence, both national and international, on 
harmful gambling impacts and on current governance and regulation of gambling in Australia.  
Gambling harm prevention needs to be a central plank in the Commonwealth government’s 
health plan, underpinned by a strong public health Action Plan as summarised in Figure E.1.
A National Action Plan for Gambling Governance and Re-Regulation is a whole-of-system 
public health approach, squarely based on a risk and prevention strategy that incorporates:
• product (safety/regulation);
• venue (responsibility);
• industry obligations (host responsibility and duty of care);
• regulatory oversight (data monitoring);
• independent research (integrity);
• evidence based policy; and
• independent audit/monitoring of policy and venue-level interventions. 
 
R1:  We recommend the establishment of a National Gambling Fund to be financed by a 
2 per cent levy on the gambling industry and a new national lottery.
A reform agenda to wean the states off their reliance on gambling taxes needs to fund 
incentives. In the current fiscal climate, new sources of funds need to be tapped. The 
introduction of a new Commonwealth tax of 2 per cent of net gambling revenue would raise 
an estimated $378 million annually.  The Australia gambling industry is under-taxed.  
Currently, the gambling industry benefits from numerous State and Commonwealth tax 
concessions such as the casino high roller exemptions from GST and tax and other 
concessions granted to casinos and clubs.  A 2 per cent levy on the gambling industry across 
all forms of gambling should be in addition to the universal gross revenue levy on the racing 
industry recommended by the Productivity Commission.
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The establishment of a new National Australian Lotteries Commission.  Lotteries have been 
shown to be one of the least harmful forms of gambling7. Successful models of government-
operated lotteries can be found in the United Kingdom and Western Australia and we propose 
that such a model be developed for Australia.  This would help raise the revenue needed to 
provide incentives to the States to wean themselves off other, more harmful forms of 
gambling revenue. In the longer term, funds could be used to finance heritage, parks, 
community-building and sustainability initiatives.
In addition to these two major funding reforms to finance a National Gambling Fund, a range 
of other reforms are needed to address the incentives the states currently have to raise revenue 
from gambling and to provide greater protections for consumers.  
R2:  We recommend modifying the funding formula used by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission to ensure that state governments have an incentive to reduce their reliance 
on revenue from gambling related sources. 
 
R3: We recommend new national consumer protection and product safety standards.
A new national system of consumer protection would be advanced through modifying the 
national consumer protection laws to implement the Productivity Commission’s 
recommendations for a new national generic consumer law (outlined in its Review of 
Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework (Fitzgerald et al 2008) and a national universal 
player tracking/monitoring system that would be used to monitor policy as well as venue-
level interventions. This would use technology already available and used for protective 
interventions elsewhere internationally. 
 
 
R4:  We recommend the introduction of a range of new product safety standards that go 
further than the current Productivity Commission (2010) recommendations, to ensure 
that gambling consumers are protected from dangerous machines in the same way that 
automotive consumers are protected from dangerous vehicles. In particular these new 
standards should include changes both to gaming machines, gaming venues and 
regulatory oversight systems: 
• banning note acceptors on gaming machines; 
• banning ATMs in gaming venues; 
• reviewing venue hours (mandatory 8 hour break/shut-down in clubs and hotels; 6 
hours for casinos); 
• introducing compulsory smart cards (or form of universal ID) linked to independent 
Central Monitoring System; 
• slowing down the machines to a maximum loss of $100 per hour; 
• introducing a compulsory 10 minute cooling off period after 1 hour of continuous 
gambling; 
• re-regulating casinos via mandated codes of practice (e.g., using central monitoring 
system (CMS) for independent monitoring and player protection interventions); and 
• Putting in place indicators that measure the costs of gambling impacts-suicide, crime, 
debt in the community, bankruptcy etc. 
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A national system of consumer protection and new product safety standards need to be 
supported by reforms at the venue level, bans on credit for gambling and controls on 
interactive gambling.   
 
 
R5:  We recommend reforms to the provision of gambling provider’s license to operate
to ensure that gambling providers have both a duty of care to their customers and a 
duty of care to their employees.  
Further, as part of a new money laundering and fraud prevention strategy, gaming licensees 
should be required to demonstrate that they have taken adequate steps to ascertain the probity 
of any funds being gambled. 
 
 
R6:  We recommend the ban on interactive gambling should be maintained and the 
National Finance Regulations used to ban ATMs and access to finance (cash or credit) 
within any gambling venue including casinos.  
 
 
R7:  We recommend the establishment of a new Independent National Gambling 
Research and Probity Commission funded by the National Gambling Fund. 
The Commonwealth should take the lead in introducing a national player tracking system to 
identify abnormal or ‘risky’ playing patterns for all forms of gambling.  Such a player 
tracking system would enable individual player protections as well as providing a new source 
of data to monitor the extent of problem gambling.  Such data would assist in both policy 
development and fraud detection as well as assessment of interventions aimed at player 
protection. 
 
The Independent National Gambling Research and Probity Commission should be responsible 
for the new national anti-fraud and anti-money laundering strategies including, inter alia,
analysis of the data collected from the proposed national player tracking system.  
 
Independent research is essential to monitor reforms to the industry, for nationally 
consistent policy and to keep abreast of developments in the industry and consumer 
protections. 
R8:  We recommend an MOU between the Australian Crime Commission and the (new) 
Independent National Gambling Research and Probity Commission regarding the use of 
a player tracking database to detect instances of money laundering and other ‘signs’ of 
criminal activity.
The Commission should have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Australian 
Crime Commission to ensure that gambling data is utilised in the fight against organised 
crime. 
Figure E.1 draws together these recommendations under a National Action Plan for Gambling 
Governance and Re-Regulation.
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Figure E.1
National Action Plan for Gambling Governance and Re-Regulation
Notes
** Re-regulation would include licence to operate, mandated industry codes of practice, employee duty of care, host responsibility.
: * Recommended by Productivity Commission 2009.
*** Incorporate data from national player tracker system, new Commission to set research agenda, publication of research and publication 
of audit reports.
**** National Gambling Fund run as an independent charity.
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Overview
Our central argument
Australia did without gaming machines until their exponential growth in the mid 1980s when 
States/Territories legislated to establish casinos followed by the expansion of electronic 
gaming machines (EGMs) into hotels and clubs throughout the community.  It was not long 
before States became addicted to the revenue.  Now the Commonwealth needs to play a new, 
leading role in winding back gambling thereby protecting communities and the integrity of 
Australian culture from gambling saturation.  The current impasse is driven by government 
and corporate/transnational gambling industry vested interests.  The global gambling 
complex8 has turned State/Territory governments into complicit co-producers of harmful 
impacts from gambling and in particular, EGMs (or poker machines), casino-expansion and 
new technology forms of gambling including automated table games, automated racing 
machines, internet casino games, poker games, poker machines, wagering, sports betting and 
contract for difference9 (the latter is regulated under Financial Services). 
This policy paper overviews the evidence, explains ‘what’s the problem’ and articulates a 
solution.  With States so beholden to protecting their regressive gambling tax revenue flows,
and with so little action over the last decade, this solution needs to be strongly and 
emphatically driven by the Commonwealth, to achieve public interest protections from 
gambling-related harms, as part of the National Health Reform Plan. 
The Commonwealth needs to lead on an integrated National Action Plan for Gambling 
Governance and Re-Regulation with new policies and institutions and financial incentives 
to the states to wind back their dependence on gambling taxes.  Compared to other ‘dangerous 
consumptions’ such as alcohol and tobacco, which incur public costs, the gambling industry is 
currently under-taxed.  A 2 per cent levy on the industry and a new National Lottery 
Commission would fund a National Gambling Fund.  This Fund would finance 
Commonwealth incentives to the States/Territories (via the Grants Commission) to downscale 
their dependence on gambling revenue.  At a national level, the fund would be used to finance 
new governance arrangements including an Independent National Gambling Research and 
Probity Commission that would conduct research, oversee a National Player Tracking Data 
System and fund probity audits of gambling industry performance on mandated industry 
codes of practice.  A tough new national regulator (within the ACCC) would oversee 
mandated codes of gambling industry practices on host responsibility and employer duty or 
care linking license to operate and probity auditing on ‘avoidable harms’ caused by gambling.  
This system would guarantee much-needed transparency, good governance and probity of 
consumer protection-driven regulation at a national level.
For the first time, this National Action Plan spells out the integrated reform agenda for 
revenue-neutral national re-regulation of gambling.  This focus on prevention from gambling-
related harm needs to be a central element of the Commonwealth government’s National 
Health Reform Plan.
What’s the problem? 
After two decades of exponential growth of the gambling industry in Australia, there is wide 
recognition of the harms and negative consequences associated with gambling; and in 
particular, electronic gaming machines (EGMs) and gambling in Australia’s 13 casinos. 
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As outlined by Productivity Commission Chairman Gary Banks in 2004, 2007, the October 
2009 Productivity Draft Report and the final report (delivered to the government on February 
26 and released on July 23, 2010), and in countless submissions to the recent inquiry, little of 
real import has happened since the landmark 1999 Productivity Commission Inquiry raised a 
raft of issues and recommended urgent reforms.  The Productivity Commission gives 
numerous examples of how harm minimisation measure introduced by various 
States/Territories ‘lack “bite”.10 In the meantime, the problems caused by gambling have 
widened and deepened and gambler losses are in excess of $19 billion annually.
While the Productivity Commission’s 2010 report presents valuable data on gambling and 
makes some strident recommendations (particularly on pre-commitment strategies and 
reducing the intensity of gaming machines), it is not clear on the principles and governance 
system that should underpin a national public health and consumer protection approach to 
gambling. The Productivity Commission is strong on problem identification but weak on an 
integrated national approach to remedying the problems caused by gambling and actions to 
address State Government’s dependence on gambling taxes. Many of the Commission’s 
recommendations call on State Governments to act – when the last decade of inaction has 
established this is unlikely to happen. 
The Productivity Commission’s emphasis on ‘cost-benefit trade-offs’ and it’s about-turn on 
online gaming lack an adequate evidence base. Its recommendations to ‘amend the Interactive 
Gambling Act to allow online poker games, subject to a strict regime of consumer protection’
and to ‘exempt online gambling providers from bans on credit cards’ are concerning 
(Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 36, 23).  The PC puts exactly the same set of arguments 
(i.e., to better to legalise/regulate, to ‘protect players’, prevent crime and to raise tax revenue) 
that were previously used by State governments to roll out gaming machines in the 1990s. 
We need to ask whether Australians want a proliferation of casino and poker machine games
on their computers and in their homes accessible to minors and people who are vulnerable.  
Rather than further legalising online gambling11 current prohibitions need to be maintained 
and there needs to be a review of the adequacy of consumer protection in currently legalised 
telephone and internet wagering, sports betting, spread betting and contract for difference.
Despite its commitment to a public health approach, the Productivity Commission is not clear 
on how this would look operationally, the principles that should underpin a genuine public 
health and consumer protection approach to gambling, and how their report links with their 
earlier call for a consistent, single, national, generic consumer law; as set out in their 2008 
report, “Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework” (Fitzgerald et al. 2008).
This paper argues:
Section 1:  What’s the problem? The evidence  
We argue there is strong evidence both in Australia and internationally, which recognises the 
harms caused by EGMs as they are currently configured.  Communities recognise this and 
object in particular, to the concentration of poker machines in areas of socioeconomic 
disadvantage.  The research evidence on harms from EGMs, and State/Territory inaction, 
supports the need for Commonwealth intervention.  Gambling has taken hold, inserting a 
cultural redirection into communities that the majority of citizens resent.  This is evident 
particularly in disadvantaged suburbs, green fields-new suburbs and Indigenous communities 
and in regional cities.  The imperative for a new framework is clearly illustrated by the time-
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bomb awaiting Victoria as the state-wide ratio of ten machines per 1,000 people will likely be 
used, post 2012, to re-locate machines into heavily mortgaged, urban fringe, greenfields 
markets.
Section 2:  Regulatory failure and vested interest  
We cannot expect State/Territory governments to intervene because they have demonstrated 
they are too dependent on gambling tax revenue to want to change things.  In fact, State 
gambling policy and program agendas are in the main, barriers to the protection of consumers.  
The States are at the same time the provider of machines, the regulator of the gaming industry 
and the beneficiary of gambling taxes.  This has proven to be an impossible conflict of interest 
and a barrier to reform.
Section 3:  The need for a new public health framework  
The prevailing addictions/informed choice or individual pathology approach to gambling 
policy needs to be replaced by a public health consumer Risk and Protection Strategy
underpinned by public health and consumer protection principles.  Constructing ‘the problem’ 
in terms of harm minimisation to address problem gambling (as for example in the 
Productivity Commission’s terms of reference), side-steps the key issue of the impact of 
gambling, and EGMs in particular, on the social and economic sustainability and cultural 
autonomy of communities. 
There is a need for a national approach that ensures consumer protection and community 
sustainability with cultural autonomy (letting communities determine local leisure 
opportunities).  In this section we outline what a new National Gambling Risk and Protection 
Model would look like.  This model would encompass a national universal database across all 
forms of gambling overseen by an Independent National Gambling Research and Probity 
Commission, with audit and performance targets to:
• protect communities from gambling saturation;
• monitor a national player tracking data base across all forms of gambling;
• protect vulnerable consumers and youth from gambling;
• render gambling precincts and systems safe from gambling-induced harms, violence, 
extortion and crime under threat of closure;
• monitor gambling venue/provider responsibilities under mandated codes of practice; 
and
• protect gambling industry employees from higher than average rates of problem 
gambling.
 
Section 4: The need for Commonwealth intervention 
The Commonwealth needs to intervene on matters of consumer protection, financial probity 
of the gambling industry and it needs to provide incentives to reduce States/Territories’ 
reliance on gambling revenue. These reforms are consistent with the transfer of funds under 
Section 96 of the Australian Constitution; recent High Court rulings on Commonwealth 
corporations powers.12 recent discussion on the need for Commonwealth leadership in other 
policy areas13 and COAG’s (Council of Australian Government) undertakings on a new form 
of federalism that is ‘regulatory, conditional and prescriptive in nature, at least in the 
formulation of performance goals and reporting requirements’ (Griffith 2009, p. i). 
We argue incentives need to be made available to the states via the Grants Commission 
formula, with a range of possible measures or key performance indicators for States and 
Territories reducing gambling revenue in real terms; with the baseline set at financial year 
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2009/10 to be achieved within three years.  This is in tandem with other initiatives we 
recommend within the Commonwealth jurisdiction under consumer, financial services, 
Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC), Australian Crime Commission 
(ACC) and Corporations laws. 
 
Section 5: Policy Initiatives and Recommendations  
This section outlines a three year revenue-neutral plan for Commonwealth funding to reward 
states that decrease their reliance on gambling revenue.  Crucial elements of the Action Plan 
include establishing a new National Gambling Fund, new national policies and institutions to 
ensure consumer protection, gambling product safety, fraud-prevention, a national player-
tracking system and independent national research.
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1. What’s the problem?
1.1 The evidence
Given the focus of this policy paper on solutions, we give a brief summary of ‘What’s the 
problem with gambling’.  This has been articulated long and clear by researchers and 
community interest advocates over the last two decades; by numerous submissions to the 
Productivity Commission inquiries in 1999 and 2009, by public hearing testimonials; and is 
seen repeatedly in media reports of gambling-related fraud, crime, suicide, the impact on 
families and communities and money laundering.  The Productivity Commission, 2010 final 
report collates much of the evidence.
Figure 1.1
A multifaceted industry, with a ‘hidden’ side
Source: The Productivity Commission (2010, p. 2.5)
Of the $19 billion gambling industry in Australia poker machines in hotels and clubs 
constitute 55.0 per cent and in casinos an additional 7.2 per cent (Productivity Commission 
2010 p. 7).  Australia has one of the highest per capita densities of poker machines in the 
world14 (1 per 110 persons), some of the highest per capita losses and some of the highest 
government dependencies on gambling as a source of state budget funding. With the 
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exception of New South Wales (where gaming machines were introduced from the mid 
1950s) and Western Australia (which has held out against community gaming machines and 
has not expanded gaming outside the Burswood casino), other States and Territories 
underwent an exponential expansion of casino and community-based gaming since the mid 
1990s. 
In many States, gambling began in clubs, and spread later into more commercialised hotels 
from about the mid 1990s. Clubs were licensed for gambling and given lower tax rates than 
hotels on the grounds of supposed ‘community benefit’. This expansion of gambling was 
motivated principally by state governments seeking to augment State-generated revenues in 
the context of reduced Commonwealth sources of revenue.  Consequently, State governments 
have become willing ‘co-producers’ in an expansion of the gambling industry, driven by 
powerful hotel, gambling and liquor industry lobbyists.  Overnight, casinos were allowed to 
build in prime city locations with guaranteed people-flows.  Previously struggling hotels with 
new gaming licenses fetched millions on the property market, and private entrepreneurs 
pocketed millions in newly made profit made from the gaming machines. 
Figure 1.2
A Chronology of Liberalisation 
Source: Banks 2007, p. 3.
Clubs, and then the more intensive revenue from hotels and licensed premises, have resulted 
in revenues to State and Territory governments, based on gaming losses, outstripping 
expectations. Today, it is concerning that State and Territory governments are reliant on poker
machines for significant and growing amounts of own-sourced revenue; approximately $5 
billion in state taxes was collected in 2008-09 (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 6.33).  
The 1999 Productivity Commission report was a watershed.  It was thorough, independent 
and attracted international attention.  The key findings of the 1999 Productivity Commission 
Report included:
• gambling is a large and growing industry;
• it has substantial benefit to consumers;
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• the social costs are ‘also large and could exceed benefits’ e.g., 130,000 severe 
problem gamblers;
• problem gamblers accounted for a large share of total expenditure (2.1 per cent of the 
population account for an estimated 33 per cent15
• gaming machines (pokies) are ‘the biggest reform issue’; and
of industry revenue);
• ‘poor industry practices and poor government regulation contributed to poor 
outcomes’ (Banks 2007, p. 8).
Since that report, gambling expenditure has continued to climb, albeit, at slower rates of 
growth than the expansionist 1990s.
Figure 1.3
Total Real Gambling Expenditure 1980/81 to 2005/06
Source: Australian Gambling Statistics, 2005/06 (Office of Economic and Statistical Research).
As argued by Banks, the growth in gaming expenditure ‘has been entirely due to poker 
machines’ (Banks, 2007, p. 15).
This is still largely true, as electronic machines in clubs and hotels have grown from 29 per 
cent to 55 per cent between 1986/87 and 2008/09. But at the same time, casino revenue
(comprising principally table games and machine gambling) has also grown from 9 to 18 per 
cent; and accordingly, lotteries and wagering have decreased their percentage share of 
gambling revenue (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 2.9).
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Figure 1.4
Growth in Gaming Expenditure 1990/91 to 2004/05
Source: Banks 2007, p. 15
Gaming machines have continued to expand as a proportion of total gambling expenditure as 
shown in Figure 1.5 (Productivity Commission 2010, p. 6).  Moreover, the per capita 
expenditure on gaming machines has continued to rise16 (although expenditure per participant 
is a more valid indicator for examining increases in personal expenditure).  Even these figures 
hide the real extent of the proportion of gambling expenditure, which derives from gaming 
machines, as the figures for casinos are frequently not included in the gaming machine total.  
A recent study into the Economic and Social Impact of Gambling in Tasmania (SACES 2008) 
reported that gaming machines “accounted for 14 per cent of total expenditure in the two 
casinos in 1987/88 to now account for 92 per cent in 2006/07”.  
Figure 1.5
Gaming Machines and Total Gaming Expenditure 1990/91 to 2004/05
Source: Banks, 2007, p. 16.
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Figure 1.6
Per capita expenditure (2004/05) by State/Territory
Source
But this revenue is unevenly spread across States/Territories (see Figure 1.6).  Northern 
Territory figures are distorted by its internet sports betting from outside the Territory and 
Western Australia does not have EGMs outside Burswood Casino.
: Banks 2007, p. 17.
In its assessment of the evidence, the Productivity Commission 2010 report highlights some 
important findings:
• ‘The risks of problem gambling are low for people who only play lotteries and
scratchies, but rise steeply with the frequency of gambling on table games, wagering
and, especially, gaming machines.
• Most policy interest centres on people playing regularly on the ‘pokies’. Around
600,000 Australians (4 per cent of the adult population) play at least weekly.
• While survey results vary, around 15 per cent of these regular players (95 000) are 
‘problem gamblers’. And their share of total spending on machines is estimated to 
range around 40 per cent.
• The significant social cost of problem gambling — estimated to be at least $4.7 
billion a year — means that even policy measures with modest efficacy in reducing 
harm will often be worthwhile (Productivity Commission’, 2010, p. 2). 
The Productivity Commission recognises the need for better, more effective regulation:
The need for regulation and other policy measures has not waned, but such measures need 
to be part of an effective and coherent package — one that recognises that the technologies 
for the delivery of gambling services are changing rapidly (Productivity Commission, 2010, 
p. 20).
But, disappointing from a consumer protection point of view, are the Productivity 
Commission’s back-down on a proposal for a statutory duty of care since the 2009 draft final 
report; its recommendation for a ‘staged liberalisation’ of on-line gaming (commencing with 
online poker (card) games (PC 2010, p. 22); its recommendation to exempt online gambling 
providers from bans on credit cards (p. 23); its emphasis on an opt-in precommitment model; 
and its focus on cost-benefit trade-offs where it is difficult to quantify personal losses such as 
depression, suicide, marital breakdown and loss of trust caused by gambling-related 
deception.
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Moreover, leaving reforms to the states or to the gambling Ministerial Council comprised of 
state/territory Gaming Ministers, will drown in delay and compromise; as currently illustrated 
by the delays in even mild reforms and the stalemates on national research17.
1.2 Impact on communities
What no one was really saying was how the machines are designed to encourage continuous 
play and how targeted marketing and product placement have impacted on particular 
communities. Industry and government regulators would contest the statement that gaming 
machines have been strategically placed in disadvantaged communities.  That is true, this was 
not always the case, but rather they were most often simply made available on the basis of an 
application by virtually any hotel or club; and then perfect knowledge on turnover and player 
spend soon indicated which games and which venues yielded the most revenue. 
Informed by years of research conducted in the United States, and since the 1950s in 
Australia, the industry knows its markets.  The Australian hotel and club industry learnt very 
quickly that certain Local Government Areas (LGAs) were more susceptible to participation 
on gaming machines.  An application for either the transfer of machines from one location to 
another or from one venue to another venue almost always invariably involved a movement 
from a higher-ranking socioeconomic area to a lower ranking area.  This form of predatory 
behaviour in the marketplace forced governments to reluctantly consider State-wide caps on 
machine numbers and regional caps across the spatial economy.  But these have been imposed 
‘after the horse has bolted’ i.e., when the saturation of machines may have reached toxic 
levels; and where caps make little difference in terms of protecting communities or reducing 
harms.
While thoroughbred racing entices the upper classes, the industry knows the main market for 
gaming machines is lower middle and middle class communities – young men on average 
weekly wages, lonely older citizens, people who are recently divorced or bereaved, ethnic 
groups from cultures where gambling is restricted and women looking for somewhere safe 
and warm to socialise.  Like any product, gambling has its segmented markets and marketing 
strategies.  Games are designed to attract action and escape gamblers younger and older, 
different ethnicities, working and not working, women and men.
There is an unequivocal inverse relationship between net gaming revenue (NGR:  that is the 
amount lost by gamblers on gaming machines) and average incomes by Local Government 
Area (LGA) for States including Victoria, South Australian and Tasmania and a direct 
relationship between NGR and the average ranking on the Socio-economic Index for Areas 
(SEIFA Index).  Put simply, those in high income areas tend not to gamble on gaming 
machines while those in low income areas gamble, and sometimes excessively. Placement 
of machines becomes crucial to local accessibility. The Victorian gambling prevalence survey 
found that 57 per cent of Victorians travelled less than 5 kilometres to access participate in 
gambling (ANU 2004, p. 81).
The harmful impacts on communities are now well recognised – even if governments have 
not systematically collected impact statistics.  The Canadian Socio-Economic Indicators of 
Gambling (SEIG) project has developed a framework for measuring the social and economic 
impacts of gambling in Canada (Manitoba Gaming Control Commission 2007), and the 
comparative Western Australia-Victoria scoping community impact study funded by the 
Victorian Gambling Research Panel (SACES 2005) compared the impact on communities in 
26 ALFRED DEAKIN RESEARCH INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES
Risky business:  why the Commonwealth needs to take over gambling regulation Page 11
Hancock and O’Neil August 2010
Victoria and Western Australia.  (See Doughney 2002, 2007 and Australian Institute for 
Primary Care 2006 and Livingston and Woolley 2008 on the impact of gaming machine 
games and features.)
Adverse community impacts of gambling include crime, family break up, financial ruin and 
bankruptcy, suicide and self harm (Australian Institute of Primary Care 2006, Doughney 
2006, 2007; SACES 2005; Productivity Commission 2009; de Castella 2009; Hagan 2010; 
and in the United Kingdom May-Chahal 2007; Wheeler 2010).
There is significant community opposition to gambling.  ‘Gambling has been imposed 
throughout Australia against the wishes of the majority of people and is a supply-led rather 
than a demand-led industry.  In 1957, a year after poker machines were legalised in New 
South Wales, a study found that 65 per cent of people disapproved of them.  In 1999, the 
National Gambling Survey found that 75 per cent of respondents thought gambling did more 
harm than good, and 92 per cent wanted no more poker machines’ (Harrison 2000). 
Communities are vocal in their opposition to gambling.  In Victoria in 2003, the Gambling 
Research Panel funded 2003 Community Attitudes Survey (ANU 2004, p. 129) reported;
– 85 per cent of Victorians agreed that ‘Gambling is a serious social problem in 
Victoria;
– 90 per cent agreed that ‘The Victorian government should reduce the number of 
poker machines’
– 76 per cent agreed that ‘Gambling is too widely accessible in Victoria’;
– 74 per cent agreed that’ The number of poker machines in Victoria should be 
reduced’;
– 91 per cent agreed ‘There should be more clubs and hotels without poker machines’;
and
– 87 per cent agreed ‘Banknote acceptors should be removed from EGMs’.
1.3 Gambling taxes are regressive
On all measures of income (i.e., derived from holding of assets, investments and savings) 
including receipt of imputation credits from investment in the share market, the proportion of 
adults receiving interest income and adults with net capital gains, a clear inverse relationship 
is observable.  That is to say, the wealthy and those in high-income areas tend not to gamble 
on electronic gaming machines.  To ignore this relationship in the design of gambling policy 
and public policy more generally is an abrogation of responsibility by government.  Imagine 
if this relationship between income and health or income and education were ignored in the 
setting of health and education policy?  In fact it never is; witness the use of postcode data to 
determine socio-economic status as a basis of funding provided to schools.  
A further sobering statistic, again by Local Government Area, is that the average gaming 
machine earns four times the average median monthly income of an individual worker, and 
this relationship is again most strongly observed in lower socioeconomic areas relative to 
higher income areas and across all states.  For example, in the Playford LGA in South 
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Australia in 2008, the average machine made $9,600 per month while the median monthly 
income was $1,477.
Relying on gambling expenditure-derived taxes is, therefore, highly regressive i.e., where 
poor people are taxed more heavily as a proportion of their incomes than the better off. 
Moreover activities financed by gambling tend to largely benefit the middle class (e.g., 
funding operas and the arts).
1.4 The harms of gambling
Research on the harms of EGMs as they are currently configured reinforces the need to re-
assess the proliferation of EGMs in casinos and community settings throughout Australia.
There is now a substantial evidence base to confirm the increasing harms from gambling, and 
in particular electronic gaming machines, since the 1999 Productivity Commission report.  In 
that report the Productivity Commission grouped the costs and personal harms into five 
categories:  financial costs, effects on productivity and employment, crime and court related 
costs, personal and family impacts and treatment costs.  The costs and impacts on problem 
gamblers and their families are the most direct costs.
Individual prevalence rates and localised harm
The population prevalence rate of problem gambling (over the whole population) indicates 
that a significant number of Australians each year become problem gamblers or are at risk of 
becoming problem gamblers (see Productivity Commission 1999; Banks 2002, Banks 2007, 
Productivity Commission 2009, 2010).  More particularly, we need to be concerned about the 
exposure of regular players to the risk of problem gambling- given that about 20 to 30 per 
cent of Australian adults do not gamble at all, only about one third (or less) of Australians 
play gaming machines in any particular year (PC, 2010, p. 5.22) and that only about 15 per 
cent of adults gamble weekly or more on non-lotto forms of gambling (Productivity 
Commission 2009, 4.26).  Here we have a form of consumption where regular exposure to the 
product is a risk factor for harm.
Prevalence estimates still equate to approximately 400,000 Australians (with higher rates in 
particularly vulnerable sub-populations) who have problems or are at moderate risk of 
problems with gambling.  Taking the Wood and Williams definition of problem gambling, the 
PC (2009, p. 4.23) estimated ‘around 410,000 moderate to severe problem gamblers’ which 
equates to about 2.5 per cent of the Australian population,18 noting that only 0.15 of the same 
population are admitted to hospital each year due to road accidents) – with many more ‘at 
risk’.  Added to the impact on individuals themselves, the social impacts on others (their 
families and communities) are appreciable (Productivity Commission 2010, p. 6.32;
Delfabbro 2009).
This means that the net widening impacts of gambling are substantial. So using the 
Productivity Commission’s 1999 analysis, the social costs still loom large relative to the 
benefits – and the ‘evidence’ provides no basis for complacency by government or the 
industry. 
Research confirms that regular gamblers contribute approximately 92 per cent of EGM 
revenue (in the Canadian context Schellinck and Schrans, 2004; 2007), and that people cycle 
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in and out of problem and risk behaviour.  The gambling industry clearly asserts the ‘80-20 
rule’, that 80 per cent of revenue (gamblers’ losses) derives from 20 per cent of EGM users 
(Tabcorp senior executive Tricia Wunsch cited by Doughney 2007, p. 316).  Australian 
economist Julie Smith gives a similar figure arguing the ‘heaviest 20-30 per cent of gamblers 
typically account for some 80 per cent or more of total gambling expenditure’ and that 
Australian data suggest around 90 per cent of reported gambling expenditure derives from the 
heaviest 10 per cent of gamblers’ (Smith 2000, p. 131).19 On revenue data reported by the 
Productivity Commission (2009) for EGM players this would mean that 6.5 per cent of these 
EGM gamblers contributed $10.65 billion of the total gambling take of $18.19 billion. 
Localised access means that harm is exacerbated by the ‘suburbanisation’ of EGMs in local 
clubs and hotels (e.g., Productivity Commission 1999; Banks 2002; Doughney 2002, 2007; 
SACES 2008).  There are approximately 5,600 local venues with gaming machines in 
Australia (excluding casinos) with some 200,000 machines.  Based on prevalence estimates of 
problem gambling, including moderate and severe gamblers there are 410,000 adults who 
gamble excessively.  This implies as a “picture into the personal harms”, on average, that:
• each machine is responsible for the creation of two problem gamblers; and
• that each local venue is responsible for 71 moderate and severe problem gamblers.
EGMs are concentrated in areas of socioeconomic disadvantage (e.g., Australian Institute of 
Primary Care 2006, Livingston and Woolley 2008; Doughney 2002, 2007; and similarly in 
the United Kingdom, May-Chahal et al 2007).  In short there are more machines, more venues 
and greater accessibility to gaming in lower socio-economic status areas.  It is the 
accessibility and concentration of gaming opportunities which contributes to higher rates of 
gambling and higher rates of problem gambling (SACES, 2005).
Australian and international research also confirms the Productivity Commission (1999) 
finding that 42.3 per cent of net gaming machine revenue comes from gambling by problem 
gamblers and that, since every problem gambler affects an estimated 5-10 other people, there 
is significant community impact.  Problem gamblers clearly demonstrate that people behave 
in less rational ways than orthodox economists assume that they do, which is why the 
Productivity Commission discounts a fair portion of the consumer surplus (pleasure) that 
problem gamblers derive from their gambling habit.  Nevertheless, the ostensible policy 
proposals to assist problem and severe to moderate gamblers, are based on models of rational 
choice/rational behaviour and virtually ignore the gambler ‘loss of control’ literature (in 
particular, Dickerson 2004).
Problem gamblers and those at risk are common in venues in terms of both money and time 
spent gambling and are in need of protective interventions.  It is inappropriate to represent 
tradeoffs20
…people may not even be aware about the extent to which the environment in
on this priority to balance the needs of recreational gamblers, since recreational 
gamblers are exposed to risks less frequently and may only gamble sporadically.  Protective 
measures put in place will in any case, both assist those with problems and prevent the slide 
into problems as recreational gamblers adopt more regular patterns of play.  As the 
Productivity Commission found:
which they gamble may affect their decision-making, especially when that is
combined with common faulty cognitions, vulnerability and poor recall of actual
losses (chapter 4 and appendix B)….
Around 70 per cent of EGM players report that they at least sometimes exceed
their spending limits, with 12 per cent doing so often or always. Higher risk
gamblers exceed limits more frequently and report greater harm from doing so.
Players reported greater problems limiting expenditure on EGMs compared to
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other recreational activities, like consuming alcohol, spending on tobacco and
entertainment/leisure activities …
_ As shown in chapter 4, while lower risk gamblers have a small probability of
having control problems, there are so many low-risk players that the absolute
number affected is large (Productivity Commission, 2010, 10.5-10.6).
Signalling the importance of a generalist consumer protection approach, it is entirely 
appropriate to target all gamblers with protective measures as patterns of progression into 
problem play differ, and preventive mechanisms need to be put in place up-stream – not once 
the problems occur.  This is in line with an authentic public health model based on the 
precautionary principle emphasising harm avoidance.
Loss of control over expenditure and time spent gambling results in EGM-related harms.  
Evidence shows that 85-90 per cent of regular EGM gamblers experience loss of control 
during play – indicating that gambling-related harm is currently grossly under-estimated 
(Dickerson 2004).  This highlights the need for the public policy agenda to consider product 
safety and consumer protection measures for all consumers (not just problem gamblers), 
especially in the light of evidence of lack of product safety by researchers such as Livingston 
and Woolley (2008 and Australian Institute of Primary Care 2006).
Concerns about product safety and consumer protection need to be addressed from a 
Commonwealth perspective.  Gaming is conducted in a very different context today than 
twenty years ago.  Technological changes have substantially changed gaming products, 
further indicating the need for more interventionist regulation on product safety and consumer 
protection (Australian Institute of Primary Care 2006, Banks 2002; Dickerson 2003, 2004; 
Doughney 2007; SACES 2005, Productivity Commission 2010 as recognised in the gaming 
machine reforms recommended).
The harms associated with EGM gambling put it alongside tobacco and alcohol in terms of 
the need for special laws and regulations and for duty of care obligations on providers/hosts as 
a condition of license to operate.  Some of the externalities of gambling (those often 
unforseen and longer term negative costs or effects) are acknowledged in the funding of
gambler’s help counselling and other ‘ambulance at the bottom of the cliff’ treatment and 
support services for those impacted by problem gambling (Blaszczynski and Farrell 1998; 
Harrison in the United Kingdom 2007;21 Productivity Commission 1999; SACES 2005; Stitt 
et al. 2001; Thompson et al. 1999); but such provisions have weak impact on preventing 
harms and minimising risks in the first place.
Industry knowledge of harms
In terms of good governance, ‘information asymmetry’ prevails – where government and
industry lack transparency and keep crucial information from public knowledge (e.g., recent 
Crown Casino deal with the Victorian government to increase the number of tables and 
introduce a new gaming machine tax regime).  The gambling industry and government know 
about the harms caused by gaming machines, but keep from public scrutiny crucial 
information on venue losses and the addictive qualities of specific gaming machine games and 
features (Australian Institute for Primary Care 2006; Livingstone and Woolley 2008). A 2002 
leaked Tattersall’s document with data on a card-based loyalty membership scheme tested 
across 13 venues in 2002 based on internal industry data and reported by Doughney (2006, p. 
353) showed:
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• ‘Tattersall’s regards members of its trial scheme as a reasonable approximation of 
poker machine users in general (Tattersall’s 2002, p. 42).  The data thus let us make 
informed judgements about poker machine activity in general.
• Tattersall’s make it plain that it is fearful about regulations that might force it to 
reveal such internal data to the public (2002, p. 7).
• The ‘advantage’ scheme explicitly targets already ‘high turnover’ or heavier users. It 
does this by offering ‘rewards’ designed to keep them at the machines for longer 
periods (2002, p. 45).
• The report designates women as main the target market, because about two-thirds of 
revenue comes from women.  Therefore, it says, ‘promotions should generally not be 
based on the preferences of male customers’ (2002, p. 26).
• Users are mainly in the older age groups, especially in the high loss 46-55 cohort 
(2002, p. 43).  Daytime users lose an equal, if not greater amount, than do night-time 
users (2002, p. 44).  This fits with the female and older user profile, but it 
undermines the image that ‘a harmless night out at the pokies’ is the main source of 
the industry’s revenue.
In summary, the document stated:  ‘[W]e derive enormous value’ – 57 per cent of total 
revenue – ‘from a very small group of customers’, namely the 15 per cent who lose ‘$100 
plus per visit’. Moreover ‘those 34 per cent of members who spend [i.e. lose] greater than $50 
per visit contribute over 82 per cent of value’.  It also revealed that 15 per cent spend an 
average of 153 minutes ‘playtime’ per visit, visit more than once per month and visit more 
than one venue (2002, p. 45).  That is, approximately 60 per cent of total losses derive from 
15 per cent of users who lose more than $100 each two hours and 33 minutes at the machines. 
These, of course, are heavy users by any standard’ (Doughney 2006 p. 353).
It is true that individual harm are difficult to aggregate, they may not always be able to be 
attributed to gaming and accurate measures of individual, family and community impacts/ 
harms may be difficult to measure.  However, what is well known is that accessibility and 
suburbanisation of gaming and the number of local venues elevate the participation rate and 
the potential risks for all gamblers.  It is well known that continuous forms of gambling are 
higher risk.  Analysis from the macro perspective – economic, geographical, regional data, per 
capita losses and play – and the micro perspective about individual behaviour documented in 
prevalence studies, when combined confirm the high public safety risks of continuous play on 
EGMs for problem gamblers, regular and moderate gamblers and even recreational gamblers.
As the Productivity Commission (2010) concludes after analysing the risks of developing 
problems on different forms of gambling;
... playing gambling machines (at all frequencies) had between 7 and 17 fold higher risk of 
problem gambling (using the CPGI 8+ rating) than lotteries. (PC, p. 5.28)
Because gaming machines are associated with greater problem gambling risks and the adverse 
community impacts of gambling are well documented a new reform agenda is necessary.  
That the addiction of States to gambling revenue creates an obvious conflict of interest and 
barriers to consumer protection simply strengthens the case to act.
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1.5 Conclusion
What we now know about the impact of gambling and continuous forms of gambling, such as 
gaming machines, table games and mechanised games, should compel policy makers to 
implement substantive changes to the way gambling is distributed (in terms of location and 
accessibility), what products gain approval and how they are regulated.
The national and international22
Strong statistically meaningful relationships were found for an increase in prevalence with 
increasing per capita density of EGMs, consistent with the access hypothesis and supported 
by no evidence of plateauing of prevalence with increasing density of EGMs (Storer et al 
2009, p225)
evidence points to the conclusion that gambling risk and 
problems are related to potentially harmful products and to location and accessibility of 
gambling – resulting in concentrations of unsustainable gambling among those who can least 
afford it.  Most recent evidence comes from Storer et al (2009) with a review of problem 
gambling prevalence and the concentration of electric gaming machines, where it was 
concluded that:
Gambling needs to be seen as globalised products that are currently defying regulation.  
Problem gamblers are not pathological individuals but ordinary people exposed regularly to 
gaming products that are designed to entrap i.e., that as currently configured, are dangerous 
and cause harm when played on a regular basis.  United Kingdom researcher Professor Jim 
Orford (2009, np) came to the same conclusion:  ‘Gambling more than once a week and/or 
gambling on several different activities, and/or with more money, puts people at risk’.
Problem gambling has community-wide effects – but the social and economic impacts are not 
being tracked and it is noticeable that State and Territory governments have progressively 
withdrawn research funds for these important studies.
Given this evidence, we need to ask:  What level of evidence is needed to compel 
government to implement a stronger regulatory response?  Where are the seat belts and 
airbags needed if legalised gambling is to be ‘safe’? 
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2. Regulatory Failure and Vested Interest
2.1 Inertia from fiscal benefits
State governments thought they could balance the fiscal benefits of electronic gaming 
machines (EGMs) against the known risk of harms.  The roll out of EGMs in the 1990s in 
Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, Tasmania, Queensland, Northern Territory and 
ACT, was invariably justified on State governments promising to manage the risk/benefit 
ratio.  The known harms are what justified the need for government regulation of gambling to
protect and they are what categorises gambling along with alcohol and tobacco as ‘dangerous 
consumptions’ (Orford 2009). 
Politicians such as former Victorian Premier John Cain could see the potential harms and 
steadfastly refused the machines. 
Under pressure from the collapse of financial institutions Pyramid and Tricontinental in 
Victoria, the impact of the 1990 recession, Premier Joan Kirner capitulated and she was 
quickly followed by Premier Jeff Kennett who embraced the revenue from gaming machines
and the Crown Casino monopoly in Victoria.  It is interesting to note that upon leaving office 
those two individuals and ex-Premier’s of Queensland and South Australia and the previous 
owner of the Crown Casino (Mr Lloyd Williams) have all expressed some regret regarding 
the introduction of EGMs into local communities, admitting that they did not anticipate the 
harms caused by this form of gambling and its roll-out into casinos and clubs and pubs in the 
community. 
Nor did they or successive governments that have enabled further expansion of the industry, 
including increasing the number of EGMs and tables at casinos, anticipate the on-going gains 
to State budget coffers brought by EGMs or States’ growing dependency on gambling tax 
revenue.  Even if growth has slowed, expenditure (gaming losses) continues to rise. 
We are now in a position where State governments are themselves so dependent on gambling 
revenues, that regulatory efforts to address the harms reported in the media on a daily basis, 
fall on deaf ears at State/Territory government level.  Far from being ‘one of the most 
regulated industries’, much of the regulation is ineffective in reducing or preventing known 
harms.  This is because reducing harms would reduce revenue because revenue relies 
disproportionately on problem gamblers.  As an illustration, if casino, club and hotel EGMs 
account for 62.2 per cent of $19 billion of gambling revenue, this equates to $11.82 billion on 
2008-09 figures.  Based on the conservative estimate adopted by the Productivity 
Commission in 1999  and reiterated in its latest report (2010, p. B.25) that problem gamblers 
contribute 42.3 per cent of this revenue, this equates to $4.9 billion that is derived from EGM 
problem gamblers - a sum that governments and the industry are loathe to risk losing.
While governments are so distracted by the need to protect budget revenues, the gambling 
industry has secured access to the political process at the highest levels and such light touch
regulation, that expansion of gambling has persisted basically unchallenged. 
State-level initiatives are pitched to protect and even expand revenue from gambling.  One 
example is Victoria’s auctioning of EGMs prior to 2012 when the Tattersall’s/Tabcorp 
duopoly comes to an end; amidst its declaration of the publicly meaningless but potentially 
lethal standard of 10 EGMs per 1,000 persons.  This seemingly benign distributional rule 
(decided as an outcome of a state review of regional caps on the number of electronic gaming 
machines), will assist the gambling industry to relocate post-2012 into greenfields suburban 
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locales that meet their marketing segment analysis.  Gambling will infiltrate outer fringes of 
capital cities where families are heavily leveraged in terms of household dept and vulnerable 
to the costs of peak oil and rising interest rates.  The 10 per 1,000 rule will make it difficult 
and expensive for local councils to oppose applications.
State government pollsters know that even though electorates want governments to do
something about gambling – other issues like health, education and jobs, determine votes.  
(Election of Nick Xenophon as an Independent to the Upper House in South Australia on a 
‘no pokies’ platform and to the Senate in 2007, are the exception.)  State/Territory 
governments say they listen, but they know they will invariably not be punished at the ballot 
box exclusively on a gambling policy vote.  So they maintain the dual standard of rhetorical 
concerns and commitments to ‘harm minimisation’ or ‘responsible gambling’ policies – as 
long as these make no dint on gaming tax revenue.  Examples of ineffective ‘harm 
minimisation’ measures include the introduction of clocks, lights, regional caps on machine 
numbers, variations to opening hours – except the ban on smoking in venues; which in any 
case was introduced as a public health measure23.
State/Territory governments are aware that gambling and in particular EGMs, target 
disadvantaged communities, result in multiple harms and threaten social, cultural and 
economic community sustainability.  They know that gambling products and practices 
threaten consumer safety; especially with the way that Australian EGMs are configured (i.e., 
with multiple lines of play, note acceptors and near-by ATMs located in gambling venues and 
the capacity for gamblers to spend in excess of $12,000 in one hour) (Productivity 
Commission, 2010, p. 20). 
The pragmatics of state government politics put the three or four-year electoral cycle above 
longer-term national sustainability, public health and consumer protection issues. 
States by their ‘light touch’ approach to regulation, industry monitoring and reporting have 
enabled the industry to grow and prosper, largely immune from public scrutiny.  The 
gambling industry has had access to commercial information that has enabled it to position 
and test products in high yield markets with little regard for adverse community impacts or 
harm reduction interventions. 
Those outside the industry have been in a position of information deficit, with regard to 
venue-based data on gambling losses that could then be correlated with localised detrimental 
community impacts and low levels of localised community benefits (other than wages for 
employees) going to local communities. 
Some of the most disadvantaged areas in Australia according to the SEIFA index are also 
those with the highest per capita gambling losses and the highest density of EGMs (see earlier 
comments and Australian Institute of Primary Care 2006). 
In the decade to 2000 in Victoria, gambling increased 143.6 per cent.  The Victorian local 
government area (LGA) of the City of Greater Dandenong is a case in point, as one of the 
most disadvantaged areas in Australia on the SEIFA and other indexes (see Case Study 1).  In 
the second example, three other Victorian LGAs, one urban disadvantaged (Hume), and two 
from disadvantaged rural communities:  La Trobe and the City of Greater Bendigo, illustrate 
the extent of gambling losses since the roll out of localised gaming machines in 1992/3 and 
the current high per capita expenditures, which continue unabated (Hancock 2009).
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2.2 Case Study 1:  City of Greater Dandenong (Victoria)
In Victoria, the Gaming Machine Control Act permitting the introduction of electronic 
gambling machines (EGMs), was proclaimed in 1991, and in June 1992 the first gambling 
machines commenced operation. In the succeeding nine years, the number of gambling 
machines in Victoria increased to almost 30,000 (including Crown Casino); while in 
Melbourne’s City of Greater Dandenong, their number rose to a peak of 1,184 in 2000, before 
declining to the level of 1,078 in 2006/07.
In 2008/2009, $121 million was lost to electronic gambling machines in the 16 gaming 
venues in Greater Dandenong – equivalent to $1189 per adult (and an increase from $1,093 
per adult in 2006/7). This is nearly eight times the rate of gambling losses of $152 per head in 
wealthy local government area, Boroondara, As Pointed out by Dandenong City Council,: 
‘Where gambling losses are considered in terms of average weekly income in the localities 
where they are incurred, this disparity becomes even more stark.  Average gambling losses 
per adult in the wealthier suburb of Boroondara were the equivalent of just over one working 
day’s income for the average resident of that city, while losses in Greater Dandenong were 
equivalent to the income earned in nearly sixteen days by the average resident. Since gaming 
machines were introduced into Dandenong in 1992/3, $33,000 per household totalling over 
$200 million has been lost (City of Greater Dandenong 2007, 2010).24
This case could readily be replicated in all other States in Australia (excluding Western 
Australia) with lower socio-economic areas having the highest number and density of gaming 
machines, the highest losses per capita and thereby paying higher rates of tax to state 
Treasury’s than wealthier areas.
2.3 Case Study 2:  Hume, La Trobe (Valley) and the City of Greater 
Bendigo Local Government Areas (LGAs) (Victoria)
All three LGAs feature high on both disadvantage indexes (SEIFA) and on EGM revenue.
The cumulative losses to gambling in these areas since 1992/3 is astounding: $995m in Hume, 
$618m in the La Trobe Valley and $521m in Bendigo. These funds have come out of 
vulnerable communities and flow into the pockets of the gaming operators Tattersall’s, 
Tabcorp, hotel owners, clubs, the broader gambling industry and the Victorian government. 
The average losses per adult in 2007 ($887 in Hume, $861 in La Trobe and $581 in Bendigo) 
are in themselves reprehensible and conceal the magnitude of losses of individual problem 
gamblers and the unmeasured impact on families, children and the community.  Between 
them, these three areas have over 500 EGM machines.  Each machine in Hume earned 
$117,000 per year (with those in Bendigo earning about $87,000 and in La Trobe $70,000).  
Clearly these revenue figures establish the flow of funds out of vulnerable and disadvantaged 
communities. This points to the need for intervention to redirect leisure and recreational 
opportunities in ways which do not put household finances of low income areas at risk and 
that build community cohesion and reward enterprise.
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Table 2.1
EGM gambling impact in selected disadvantaged areas
Hume City La Trobe City Greater Bendigo City
Venues: 2007 14 13 9
EGMs: 2007 803 593 502
EGMs per 1000 Adults: 2006/2007 7.3 11.1 6.7
EGM Gaming Losses 2006/2007 $98.1m $45.9m $43.5m
Losses per Adult 2006/2007 $887 $861 $581
Cumulative Losses since 1992/3 (2007 dollars) $995m $618m $521m
Cumulative Losses per Adult since 1992/3 (2007 $) $8,998 $11,598 $6,966
Percentage Change in Losses in year 2006/2007 3.7 4.9 1.9
Percentage Change in Losses - adjusted for Inflation 1.7 2.9 -0.1
Source
http://www.greaterdandenong.com/Documents.asp?ID=1225&Title=Gambling
Data compiled from: Gambling Indicators for Local Areas Victoria: Data set available from:
+ and 
http://www.vlga.org.au/resources/list.chtml?folder=Social%20Statistics compiled by Hancock 2009.
Gambling research demonstrates that gambling has infiltrated communities and has leached 
billions of dollars out of some of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged communities, where 
gaming machines outside casinos tend to be concentrated.  Those billions flow out of 
communities to private corporate interests and to governments. 
2.4 Casinos have been under-researched
While the community accessibility of gambling and in particular poker machines, is a major 
source of negative community reaction, Australia’s 13 casinos also need scrutiny on issues of 
secretive deals with State governments, incentives offered under loyalty schemes, community 
reach and marketing to potentially vulnerable groups (subsidised bus tours and promotional 
activities to attract senior citizens and country people) and problems associated with excessive 
drinking and gambling and 24 hour opening.  Casinos’ 24 hour accessibility has brought with 
it problems associated with violence, crime, money laundering and calls to emergency 
assistance, now being reported on a regular basis.25 Controversially, the Productivity 
Commission (2010, p. 23) has recommended that casinos should keep their current 
exemptions from certain cash restrictions and should be exempt from the recommended daily 
limit of $250 on ATM/EFTPOS withdrawals; and exempt from the requirement that payouts 
over $300 be made by cheque.
Governments use gambling revenue to fund the arts, sport, hospitals and community building 
– which amounts to a redistribution from the most disadvantaged to middle Australia.  This is 
one reason why gambling has for a long time, been seen as a regressive tax.26 After almost 20 
years of intensified gambling – especially poker machines and casinos – the harms of 
gambling and the unfairness of governments using regressive forms of taxation, are now 
widely recognised.  Despite this, State governments have opted for “business as usual”, 
because they cannot see past their dependence on gambling revenue.  This dependence 
renders them ‘co-producers’ with the gambling industry deriving mutual benefit from 
gambling expenditure.  The amount lost annually by players (net gambling expenditure) in 
Australia is over $19 billion.  This exceeds the level of household savings.  If we lost less 
money on gambling or diverted a significant proportion of expenditure to consumer durables 
including expenditure on household items, on children and families, industry sector 
multipliers confirm that this would generate far more jobs.
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3. The need for a new model 
3.1 A national approach to ensure consumer protection and community 
sustainability
This section contrasts the informed choice ‘business as usual’ model with the Public 
health/consumer protection model and proposes a new National Gambling Risk and 
Protection Model.
3.2 Critiquing the dominant model
This paper proposes an alternative model to the dominant ‘informed choice’ model that is 
commonly applied to gambling by policy makers.  The informed choice model focuses on the 
individual and misrepresents problem gamblers as minority exceptions who are weak addicts 
who lack will-power – rather than as citizens in need of consumer protection from products 
that are harmful.  It implies that people who gamble choose to do so and that they must bear 
the consequences of their actions.  Individualising “the problem” diverts attention from 
government’s responsibility to re-regulate gambling and to view gambling within its broader 
systemic context (Hancock 2009).
The informed choice model argues “Responsible gambling” is based on giving gamblers 
information, assisting them with pre-commitment (players setting limits on their gambling) 
and offering counselling/treatment for those who develop gambling-related problems.  The 
focus on giving information to consumers ignores questions of who produces the information, 
why it is produced and whether it is in fact helpful in preventing or mitigating harm.  The 
informed choice model overlooks the fact that clear guidelines are needed on the type and 
quality of consumer information that must be produced and supplied.
As in the recent Productivity Commission (2010) report on Gambling, this approach 
sometimes acknowledges harmful product design and the need to modify gaming machines.  
But the focus on individual choice and opt-in precommitment, is at odds with the need to 
examine gambling products and environments that are harmful; thus pointing to the need for 
re-regulation of gambling environments and products; alongside player monitoring as 
recommended in this report.
More critically, the informed choice model is a “hybrid” public health model that draws on 
the communicable diseases model of public health, which leaves out crucial elements of a 
genuine public health and consumer protection approach (Hancock 2009).  This is epitomised 
by the focus on “harm minimization” rather than “harm elimination and prevention”.  We are 
advised to accept a balance of risks, weighed against the claimed benefits under a blinkered 
economic model of “net community benefit”.  There is a search for one-stop answers – the 
Productivity Commission says if pre-commitment (players setting limits) is successful, we 
may not need their recommended brakes and safety measures on gaming machines. 
Governments and the gambling industry promote the informed choice model because it 
implies all that is needed for “responsible gambling” is to inform and educate individual 
players to be more responsible.  Players will be the ones responsible for modifying their 
behaviour – rather than limits and re-regulation of gambling products, environments, supply 
chains, access to cash and credit, gambling platforms and new technologies.  The industry 
proposes a similar strategy to address binge drinking and the violence that often results from 
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such behaviour.  But neither government nor the community accepts that simply efforts to 
modify behaviour, while necessary, will be sufficient.
Under the informed choice business as usual model it is assumed that:
• individuals choose to gamble but need more appropriate information- hence, once 
informed, they are assumed to make an ‘informed choice’ to spend time and money 
gambling;
• reflecting medical model approaches, problem gamblers are defined as individuals 
who are “sick or ill”;
• the chief focus is the individual pathology of problem gamblers as measured by 
DSMIV, SOGS, the CPGI or other problem gambling screens;
• gambling is legitimate entertainment for the vast majority and there is only a small 
number of problem gamblers;
• typical interventions focus on problem gamblers’ treatment and counselling services;
• treatment and prevention target problem gamblers but lack identification of risk 
groups or population prevention;
• this model approximates a “hybrid public health” model in that it does not adequately 
prevent or circumvent harms and neglects re-regulation of venues, gambling 
environments and harmful design features of gambling products; and
• in terms of regulatory models, government is co-producer of gambling (co dependent 
with the industry on revenue) leading to “light touch regulation”, which is 
concentrated on game probity, return to player within the approved range, individual 
and premises licensing and gambling tax returns to government – which essentially 
amount to “business as usual” (Hancock 2009).
An example of an ineffective harm minimisation strategy (and therefore irresponsible policy 
setting designed to have virtually no impact on revenue), is the introduction of gaming 
machine shut downs for a certain number of hours, which have been implemented in the hours 
of the morning when hotels and clubs are either closed or patronage is non-existent (e.g., 
4.00 am until 8.00 am).
The Informed Choice Model is consistent with the industry-promoted Reno model.  This 
model, promoted by the gaming industry body, The Australian Gaming Council, proposes that 
responsible gambling ‘rests upon two fundamental principles:  (1) the ultimate decision to 
gamble resides with the individual and represents a choice, and (2) to properly make this 
decision, individuals must have the opportunity to be informed’.
The Reno model extols a diverse range of interventions designed to promote consumer 
protection, community/consumer awareness and education, and access to treatment, with 
the emphasis on assisting those gamblers who already have gambling-related problems 
(Blaszczynski, Ladouceur and Shaffer (2004, p. 311). 
The shift to market models emphasising personal or individual responsibility and “choice” –
the model of informed choice – implies a level playing field that frequently overlooks the 
barriers to exercising choice for some people, whose structural disadvantage puts up barriers 
to choice.  Sometimes the triggers for problem gambling constitute vulnerabilities that put 
people at risk of harm: divorce/separation, loneliness, recent bereavement, lack of social 
supports, limited local recreational outlets, retirement, relocation, workplace stress, shiftwork, 
job loss/unemployment and mental health issues.
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Former Deputy Prime Minister Brian Howe (2007, p. 19-20), in the book, Weighing Up 
Australian Values: balancing transitions and risks, observes that ‘(s)structural changes in our 
society have made it easier for people to become isolated and excluded’ … ‘transitions’, to 
use Schmid’s term, carry an element of risk both for individuals being affected by change and 
for society as a whole. … social policy should be about working with people to anticipate 
‘risk’, so that they can manage periods of change in their lives more effectively.’  Howe 
argues that investing in transitions will help peoples’ lives be more productive, rewarding and 
satisfying.  Underpinning this investment is prevention and the public health precautionary 
principle.
We need to move on from the informed choice ‘business as usual’ model to a model that 
current research/evidence points to in order to achieve adequate public protection from risk 
and harms.  
3.3 A public health model
Government needs to champion an alternative National Gambling Risk and Protection 
Framework, grounded in public health and consumer protection – within a broader social 
ecology or ‘whole of system’ model.  Previous efforts at developing a public health model for 
gambling have fallen short (Korn 2000; Korn, Gibbins and Azmier 2003; Korn and Shaffer 
1999).  A public health model reinforces the need to reduce accessibility and environmental 
exposure to products that are designed to entrap the vulnerable.  It reinforces the 
responsibility of governments  - local, state and especially the Commonwealth – to intervene 
to protect consumers, citizens and communities from the harmful effects of gambling as it is 
currently configured. 
This model is underpinned by a commitment to good governance – transparency, 
accountability, community involvement in decision-making, monitoring/audit/review, 
consumer redress and independent research. Under this model, there is a clear role for the 
Commonwealth government to use the evidence we now have on the harms of gambling and 
to intervene with laws and regulations that protect Australians from known harms. 
Under a Public Health/Consumer Protection model, the focus is shifted ‘to the entire spectrum 
of gambling behaviour and not just on those with difficulties’ (May-Chahal 2007, p. 48).
When attention shifts to the group, the faulty mechanism is seen to lie., not in the individual 
but in the arrangements and structures to which they are subject.  Attention is focused on 
common factors linking behaviour to social arrangements.  A public health policy approach to 
gambling provision and the community-wide impacts of gambling needs to be:
• Population based;
• Concerned with social and economic organisation; 
• Multi-factorial and multi-causal;
• Recognise dynamic relationships which change over time;
• Concerned with promoting health as well as treating disease;
• Identify activities or provisions that promote or dissipate problems;
• Identify preventative strategies which minimise harm (May-Chahal et al 2007, p. 48).
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Under a public health approach, consumer protection is a priority driven by questions about 
product safety, the regulation of gambling venues and the protective measures taken. 
Government “re-regulates” in favour of consumer protection regulation.
A genuine public health model emphasises research and action on the social determinants of 
health and well-being, gambling impact monitoring and evaluation.  This model is 
underpinned by the precautionary principle, emphasising risk avoidance and risk reduction 
(prevention); with government as public interest protector.
An over-arching risk and prevention strategy locates the entire population along a continuum 
of gambling risk, with appropriate interventions differing for different levels of risk/problem, 
thus differentiating “risk” from “problem gambling”.  It offers prevention and treatment on a 
continuum from brief interventions (for example in primary care or community counselling 
settings) to intensive intervention (treatment).
This model27 takes a Population Approach to risk avoidance and risk reduction (i.e., targets all 
gamblers and not just those identified as having problems).  The public health approach 
engages with all potential and actual interests to act up-stream to prevent risk and harm. 
Under this model, a whole-of-system approach is needed that embraces:
• product (safety/regulation);
• venue (responsibility);
• industry obligations (host responsibility and duty of care);
• regulatory oversight (data monitoring);
• independent research (integrity);
• evidence based policy; and
• independent audit/monitoring.
Figure 3.1
Problem Gambling Pathway
Source: Ontario Problem Gambling Research Centre (OPGRC) Problem Gambling Pathways and Protective Factors 
Model (www.gamblingresearch.org)
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As shown in Figure 3.1 a public health approach emphasises risk avoidance and risk reduction 
rather than focusing just on those who are already harmed.  This involves:
• upstream (prevention) and downstream measures;
• protection of consumers from social and economic harms caused by unsafe 
gambling; and
• impact analysis and social determinants of health, e.g. Nova Scotia smart card pilot.
As shown in Figure 3.2, player vulnerabilities exist on a continuum from risk factors 
(erroneous cognitions, risky practices, preoccupation with gambling), to harms that come 
from impaired control, negative consequences of gambling and persistence.  Risk is 
categorically different from harms and requires different strategies and interventions.
Figure 3.2
The Public Health Model
Source: (www.gamblingresearch.org)
This ‘whole of system’ focus embraces gambling products, individual, community, industry, 
and government influences; gambling products in interaction with players; responsible 
regulation with onus of proof on product safety, upstream and downstream measures, the 
need for protection of consumers from social and economic harms, the need for impact 
analysis and collection of evidence on the social determinants of health.  This could be done 
via player tracking systems monitored by an independent consumer protection authority.  
Drawing on Dickerson’s (2004) work, this constitutes an “impaired control” model (not an 
addictions or informed consent model).
3.4 Using re-regulation to reinforce a public health approach
Currently State and Territory regulation constitutes ‘light touch regulation’ concentrating 
principally on: 
• licensing-venues, persons, operators-’routine regulation’;
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• monitoring ‘abnormal’ events;
• monitoring return to player (89-91 per cent) i.e., legal compliance;
• revenue/tax monitoring;
• the use of CMS central monitoring system to account for, collect and distribute 
gambling revenue; and
• the use by industry of CMS data on venue, machine, game, locality, platform and 
loyalty tracking data (mainly casinos) for EGM/market refinement for maximal 
returns.
The regulation of the gaming industry is essentially process-driven rather than impact-driven.  
In a comparative study of the social impacts of gambling, SACES (2009) reported that once 
certain process requirements were met, a decision by the regulator to approve an application 
or licence tended to be based on subjective assessments.  They concluded that “the definition 
of social impacts, the measurement of social impact and the tests applied to gaining licence 
applications relating to social impacts are subject to a high degree of subjectivity” (SACES, 
2009, p. v).
In contrast, responsible re-regulation based on a public health model would focus on:
• adopting the precautionary principle with new re-regulation and legislation;
• promoting socially responsible gambling by using legislated conditions of licence to 
operate strategically to protect consumers and gaming industry employees from risk 
and harm;
• mandated codes of practice (sanctions for the equivalent of ‘serving the product to 
intoxicated persons’);
• impact analysis – location and accessibility to gambling matter;
– mapping geospatial patterns of gambling (losses and help-seeking),
– tracking of particular product impacts via CMS system;
• adopting the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (AIHW) framework, based 
on a public health model that comprises determinants of health, health status and 
health system performance (where ‘health system’ takes on a broad meaning). 
A new National Gambling Risk and Protection Model would encompass a national universal 
database across all forms of gambling overseen by an Independent National Gambling 
Research and Probity Commission, with audit and performance targets for States/Territories 
to:
• protect communities from gambling saturation;
• protect vulnerable consumers and youth from gambling;
• monitor a national player tracking data base across all forms of gambling;
• render gambling precincts and systems safe from gambling-induced harms, violence, 
extortion and crime under threat of closure;
• monitor gambling venue/provider responsibilities under mandated codes of practice;
• protect gambling industry employees from higher than average rates of problem 
gambling; and
• reduce State treasuries’ proportionate reliance on gambling revenue.
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4. The need for Commonwealth intervention
4.1 What is the Commonwealth’s role in gambling?
Governments have two major policy levers with regard to gambling: taxation and regulation 
(Smith 2000). To date, there has been little Commonwealth role in gambling taxation and 
regulation -except to return GST revenues to the states and control over spread betting and on-
line gambling.
The operation of gambling has been largely a State/Territory jurisdictional matter, while the 
expansion of gambling has taken different forms, with some States adopting a more contested 
market and others like Victoria, imposing a State-sanctioned duopoly between two providers; 
Tattersall’s and Tabcorp within a State-wide limit on the number of gaming machines. 
The Commonwealth Treasury benefits from the gambling industry in terms of personal 
income tax paid by those employed in the gambling industry; corporate taxation on machine 
producers (e.g., Aristocrat) and suppliers of gambling (e.g., TAB, Tabcorp), through 
regulation of internet gambling (excluding currently outlawed pokie and casino games) and 
through general taxes.  All gambling-derived GST is transferred back to the States; minus 
costs to the Commonwealth.  
The Commonwealth policy reform role has been restricted to the Productivity Commission 
(PC) 1999 Inquiry, the current 2009/10 (more limited) Inquiry, some ATM initiatives; and 
recent national reforms to protect minors under 18.28
The small advances and the failures of the “harm minimization” efforts of the last decade are 
well documented by Banks (2002, 2007) and the Productivity Commission final Report 
(2010) and in submissions to the PC Inquiry.
The lack of action since the 1999 Productivity Commission Inquiry and State’s reluctance to 
“bite the hand that feeds them”, reinforce the need for the Commonwealth to lead a national 
(not a fragmented State/Territory) approach to reform. Setting up a national framework and 
expecting States to follow has not resulted in effective change since the last inquiry and there 
is little to demonstrate the current; fence-sitting’ inquiry will impact significantly on the 
States.
As argued by Australian economist Julie Smith (2000, p. 121) ‘it may be difficult to identify 
in whose interests governments are acting when they regulate gambling’, with some 
regulation serving to protect state revenues and to enlarge gambling markets ‘through active 
promotion and marketing’. Smith notes “there are a number of reasons why governments will 
be drawn into promoting gambling by their fiscal stake in the industry, bringing out the 
intrinsic conflict with their role as ‘social guardians’” (2000, p. 121).
4.2 The nub of the problem is states’ dependence on gambling-related 
revenue – a regressive tax
Cutbacks in federal funding to the states during the Hawke and Keating governments forced 
state and local governments into heavier reliance on own-source revenue – rising from 20 per 
cent of national taxation in the 1970s and 1980s to 24 per cent in 1997/98 with a 27 per cent 
fall in the real value of general revenue grants since the mid 1980s (Smith 2000, p. 123-124).
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The ‘high watermark’ Engineers’ case29 ‘effectively closed off major revenue options for the 
States’ which coincided with changes to indirect taxation (Williams 1999, p. 16). With 
limited sources of revenue apart from Commonwealth grants, States have had a constrained 
choice to rely on gambling and other property taxes, payroll and motor vehicle taxes 
(Williams 1999).  
Jurisdictionally, gambling has been seen as a matter for States to determine.  The 
Commonwealth government-commissioned report by the Productivity Commission (1999) 
exposed many of the inter-state anomalies and raised important questions at a national level 
concerning the net (dis)benefit of gambling; especially following the roll-out since the 1990s 
of electronic gaming machines.
Table 4.1 shows the proportionate reliance of States/Territories on gambling taxes; averaging 
nationally 10.6 per cent in 2008-09, with some States much higher.
Table 4.1
Proportion of revenue coming from gambling taxes, 2008/09
 
Source
a Total state tax revenue does not include local government tax revenue or goods and services tax (GST) revenue.
: Productivity Commission (2010, p. 2.11)
Sources: State and territory budget papers; ABS (Population by Age and Sex, Australian States and Territories, June 2009, Cat. no. 3201.0).
State governments have become increasingly reliant on gaming machine revenue (player 
losses) for substantial proportions of their revenue; with Victoria relying on gambling taxation 
(player losses) for 13 per cent of its revenue, Northern Territory 12 per cent, Queensland and 
South Australia each 11 per cent and New South Wales for 9 per cent according to the 
Productivity Commission (Table 4.1, above).30
A review of Australian Gambling Statistics data (to 2005/06) revealed that real per capita 
gaming expenditure (where gaming refers to EGMs, lotteries, games of chance) as a 
proportion of total per capita gambling expenditure (includes racing) increased in the twenty 
year period 1986/87 to 2005/06 from 62.9 per cent to 86.8 per cent.  On 2005/06 figures, for 
the $17.5 billion losses from all sources of gambling, gaming accounted for $15.3 billion.  In 
the same period expenditure per capita on racing declined from 37.1 to 12.2 per cent in 
2005/06 (Office of Economic and Statistical Research 2008).  The growth in total gambling is 
dependent on real per capita increases in expenditure on gaming machines as shown in Figure 
4.1.  This is well recognised by each State Treasury and the gambling industry, so that both 
parties are reluctant to initiate measures that would effectively reduce the number of 
machines, reduce potential hours of play, restrict large note denominations that are able to be 
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inserted into machines, restrict ATMs in gaming venues, or any initiatives that might reduce 
the aggregate turnover and hence gaming machine losses.
Figure 4.1
Gambling Expenditure:  Australia - Total Real Expenditure Per Capita
Source: Australian Gambling Statistics (AGS), 2005/06 (Office of Economic and Statistical Research 2008).
Figure 4.2
Gambling Revenue:  Australia - Real Total Government Revenue 
Source: Australian Gambling Statistics, 2005/06 (Office of Economic and Statistical Research 2008).
Government revenue from all forms of gambling follows a very similar path and illustrates 
the real challenge faced by state governments in reducing their reliance on gaming revenue.  
In that same twenty year period (1986/87 to 2005/06) real total government revenue from all 
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gambling doubled to total $4.69 billion, and the contribution from gaming increased from 
64.8 per cent to 91.8 per cent (see Figure 4.2).  The share contributed from racing declined 
from 35.2 per cent to only 7.9 per cent (AGS 2005/06).  To the extent that participants who 
gamble at and/or on the races are different to those who play gaming machines, then there has 
been a shift (expenditure and tax mix shift) in the source of revenue ‘from the punter to the 
gamer’.
The share of government revenue collected by each state from all gambling has also changed 
in the 20-year period.  The monopoly on gaming machines previously enjoyed by New South 
Wales was obviously eroded with the roll out of gaming machines in other States so that New 
South Wales' share of total government gambling revenue declined; from 48.7 per cent to 32.4 
per cent, Victoria increased its share of total government gambling revenue from 26.5 per cent 
to 31.1 per cent, South Australia from 5.2 per cent to 8.7 per cent and Queensland from 10.3 
per cent to 17.8 per cent (Office of Economic and Statistical Research 2008).
The reliance on gambling taxes and in particular revenue from EGMs is cause for concern at a 
national level.  It is cause for concern because so much of the revenue is derived from 
problem gamblers and derived from those who are more economically and socially 
vulnerable, including communities that have the least economic resources and highest levels 
of disadvantage.  It is reasonable to ask whether such reliance has reached a tipping point. 
4.3 Justification and precedents for Commonwealth intervention
At the Commonwealth government level, the previous Howard government showed little 
interest in addressing gambling issues, apart from commissioning the Productivity 
Commission inquiry in 1999.  More positively, the Rudd Labor government came to the 2007 
election with a commitment to wean State Treasuries off their addictions to gambling revenue 
and initiated the current Productivity Commission inquiry. The previous Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd has described pokies taxes as “fools’ gold” and has stated:  ‘I know we have a 
problem and I know that in partnership with States and Territories we can work through an 
agreed analysis on the social impact and what to do about it’ (Corbett 2008).
In the Senate, Independent Senator Nick Xenophon, The Greens and Family First, have also 
pledged to address gambling problems and some Coalition members express concerns; such 
as Barnaby Joyce former Shadow Minister for Finance and Debt Reduction.
State-initiated harm minimization measures have not worked.  State governments have 
claimed social benefits for various forms of restriction on gambling markets, such as more 
recently, caps on the number of gaming machines at State and at regional or local government 
levels; but these claimed benefits remain unproven.  In fact State-wide or local/regional caps 
are ineffective policy levers because most areas are over-supplied with machines, while 
machines are able to be used more intensively (as in Victoria, where the duopoly providers 
have been able to move high tech machines into disadvantaged areas, resulting in increased 
machine revenue – losses – despite local regional caps on the number of machines).  The 
removal of a few machines or even hundreds (as has occurred in South Australia where 
removal will not be completed for another 20 years at the current rate) has no impact on the 
continued growth in revenue.  The simple reasons for this are:  (a) existing over-supply, and 
(b) machines are currently used to only 25 to 30 per cent of their capacity, rendering 
communities vulnerable to marketing aimed at increasing the number of players and time 
spent on machines. 
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Despite a long list of “harm minimization” measures implemented by the States over the last 
decade, net gambling expenditure (player losses) continues to rise.  Much of this revenue 
flowing into State Treasuries and the gambling industry as profits, comes from areas of low 
socioeconomic status and from people who can ill-afford these high levels of expenditure on 
gambling.  Gambling may appeal to certain demographics but this does not mean they ask for 
it or that high stake, high density gambling is beneficial to those communities.
We argue there are opportunities available at the national level, which now need to be 
invoked to pull back the harms caused by gambling to individuals, families and communities, 
and ultimately to protect Australia’s cultural integrity and social sustainability from a 
“normalization” of gambling.  By this we mean that gambling has edged out other leisure 
pursuits from local venues such as shifting music out of hotels to make room for EGMs, 
changing the ethos of local cultural hubs. Similarly, if women find clubs with EGMs safe, 
warm and welcoming, then this precludes development of safer places with similar attributes.
There are precedents for Commonwealth intervention. As in numerous areas of public policy, 
the justification for Commonwealth intervention is found in the disparate approaches adopted 
by different States/Territories, where leaving it to the States/Territories does not work, and in 
cases where there is national benefit of a co-ordinated and consistent approach.  Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) has adopted a national coordinating role in an increasing 
number of policy areas and the High Court in the Work Choices case held that the 
Commonwealth could validly use the corporations power to drive a national policy agenda in 
an area previously held as a State government jurisdiction.  This was hailed as a decisive 
ruling that sets a clear precedent for the Commonwealth government to use these powers in 
different areas (Stewart and Williams 2007).
4.4 State differences in level of taxation 
There may also be a cogent argument in terms of State/Territory differences in the level of 
taxation of gambling and ‘under-taxation’ of the industry, given its profit levels and the now-
acknowledged indirect and cost-shifting impacts of gambling harms onto government services 
and communities.31 The Productivity Commission final report on Gambling (2010)
documents differences between the States/Territories.  States vary in the amount of taxation 
levied on gaming machines.  For example, in South Australia, machines are taxed at 75 per 
cent, which has resulted in operators ‘farming’ the machines more intensively.  In contrast, 
Victorian tax concessions granted to clubs and exploited recently by the expansion of EGM 
applications from sporting and AFL clubs, and of hotel proprietors transferring licenses to 
clubs, has granted an 8.3 per cent reduction on State gambling taxes on the assumption of the 
‘community benefit’ of such operations.  As pointed out in the Productivity Commission 
report at Appendix E, on Tax Concessions, the lack of reporting and lack of available data on 
the income and expenditure of not for profits makes estimates of the cost of concessions 
difficult:  (costed at $518 million for New South Wales; $77 million for Victoria; $121 
million for Queensland and $8 million for South Australia and not withstanding other 
concessions on land tax and payroll tax granted to not for profits (Productivity Commission 
2009, E-9)).  (See also Appendix 1 of this report)
discovery
application
excellence 47
Page 32 Risky business:  why the Commonwealth needs to take over gambling regulation
August 2010 Hancock and O’Neil
4.5 The “under-taxation” of gambling as a justification for a new 
national gambling tax
Historically, Smith argued that ‘a degree of under-performance in the amount of tax collected 
by states from gambling was limited by interstate rivalry for gambling revenues (including 
Totalisator Agency Board (TAB) betting and ‘junket’ casino gamblers or where new forms of 
gambling reduce revenue of existing forms (Smith 2000, p. 124-5).  She further argued this 
under-collection is rarely quantified yet represents a budgetary cost to State government tax 
revenue.  She argued this amounts to “a substantial tax subsidy to some operators in the 
gambling industry”, for example the public ‘cost’ of tax breaks given to casino high rollers by 
State governments eager to entice business.32
Gambling compares poorly to other forms of excise:  on 1995-97 figures, gambling ad 
valorem rates of taxation stood at 51 per cent compared with 89 per cent on beer, 234 per cent 
on spirits and 212 per cent on tobacco; and 120-130 per cent on cars and petrol (Smith 2000, 
p. 134). 
Smith also contends that the level of taxation from gambling (‘assessed by comparing total 
gambling tax revenue with gambling tax activity’) has decreased from a peak in the mid 
1980s of 7 per cent (or 44 per cent of expenditure) to 4-5 per cent on turnover and 34 per cent 
on expenditure in 1995/96 (2000 p. 127-8).  Smith estimates gambling revenues would be 
about $80 million or 2 to 3 per cent higher if 1986/87 taxation rates had been applied in 
1996/97 (p. 128) and attributes this to the shift from higher taxed lotteries to lower taxed 
casinos and gambling machines.  This, she argues, constitutes a situation of States’ regulatory 
policies resulting in ‘diminishing marginal returns to revenue from the recent expansion of 
gambling activity, even if total revenues are increasing’ (Smith 2000, p. 128).  A further 
example of foregone revenue to the states is the deal on GST, which defines rebates on losses 
by casino high roller’s as ‘winnings’ and exempt from GST (Smith 2000, p. 132). 
Smith’s analysis thus calls into question current levels of gambling tax (given its community 
costs) and the exemptions and tax concessions granted to the gambling industry by State 
governments.  It also calls into question the assumption that gambling taxes, as a “voluntary 
tax” on discretionary recreational spending, are equitable or “fair” or whether they constitute 
a form of ‘tax reform avoidance’ and a ‘tax-shifting strategy by the middle class’, away from 
more progressive but fairer sources of state tax revenue.  It has been accepted for some time 
that gambling taxes are regressive (Williams 1999) and that they rely on a continuing supply 
of a relatively small number of high spending (high losing) customers, frequently from low 
income groups in particular geographic locations.  Hence, the argument that one third to one 
half of gambling revenue is contributed by the gambling of about 200,000 gamblers and their 
families (also argued by Smith, 2000, p. 131).  Nor do States redistribute gambling revenue 
back into the communities from whence it came.  Small amounts are siphoned into 
community support funds and gamblers help and other treatment but the majority of funds go 
into general revenue for other expenditures; and even disbursement of Community Support 
Funds lacks transparency as in Victoria.33
As Chapman et al (1997) observed “[t]he rates of taxation on gambling machines, agreed to 
be most addictive and producing the highest rates of problem gambling, are relatively low”. 
(cited by Smith 2000, p. 135).  Thus there is potential for gambling taxes to be restructured 
and for the tax rates to reflect better the real or underlying costs – but to acknowledge that 
such reforms are unlikely from State governments.  Nor has state government regulation been 
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effective in curbing the most damaging forms of gambling and regulators are seen as too close 
to industry and too limited in their activities.
4.6 Cost-shifting to the Commonwealth to service the costs of gambling
Another consideration is the need to address considerable cost shifting from State 
governments (which allow unsustainable levels of EGM losses) and costs incurred by the 
Commonwealth in treating the impact of gambling, for example in the area of Medicare 
subsidised GP visits.  A survey conducted by SACES as part of the Western Australia-
Victoria community impact study found that Victorian GPs are four times more likely to 
identify patients who present with issues associated with problem gambling than their 
counterparts in Western Australia (i.e., Victoria 17.7 per cent compared with Western 
Australia 4.3 per cent) (SACES 2005, pp. 116-120).  As part of this comparison it is important 
to note that EGMs in Western Australia are restricted to the casino and that problem gambling 
as reflected in prevalence rates is lower in Western Australia (0.7 per cent) than Victoria (2.14 
per cent) (Productivity Commission 1999).  Cost shifting via Medicare-funded general 
practitioner visits of this magnitude indicates considerable costs to the Commonwealth.
There are other examples of States cost-shifting to the Commonwealth in relation to gambling 
impacts such as expenditures on Indigenous financial counselling (given considerable 
Indigenous involvement in problem gambling in the Northern Territory) and the costs of 
gambling-related divorce; another Commonwealth jurisdiction.  The SACES study found that 
‘the proportion of clients with gambling problems attending financial counselling was 34 per 
cent in the “EGM state” of Victoria and South Australia compared to 20 per cent in Western 
Australia’ (SACES 2005, p. v). 
While trends in discretionary expenditure are not related to “cost-shifting” they nevertheless 
give rise to concern at the fiscal stimulus level, that is, the individual and household level.  
The Commonwealth is aware of the frequent “spikes” in gambling losses following the 
economic stimulus grants to households by the current government, and under the Howard 
Government similar “spikes” followed tax rebates, tax cuts, and hand-outs (family tax benefit, 
baby bonus) and one-off hand outs to pensioners prior to several elections.  That significant 
amounts of these grants and handouts were spent on gambling is ultimately the choice of 
individuals.  However, the intent of government is that funds would have been spent on retail 
goods, food, household or children’s items that benefit the individual, the family and the 
community providing much larger economic multipliers.  
It is well documented that gambling is a very low employment generator per million dollars 
spent (SACES 2008:  approximately 3.2 jobs compared to retail of 6.3 jobs per million of 
turnover).  This confirms overseas evidence on the displacement effect of gambling and the 
longer term public costs it brings.  US economist Professor John Kindt, of the University of 
Illinois argues for every job casinos create, 1.5 jobs are lost and that every $1 contributed to 
taxation by gambling, costs the taxpayer $3 to address the socio-economic costs of gambling 
to society (Kindt 2005).  It is important to know whether similar estimates are reliable and 
applicable to the casino industry in Australian States, but this is precisely the type of research, 
which is not funded by State gambling regulators.
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4.7 Commonwealth as a driver of the missing national picture 
Measurement and monitoring of the social and economic costs of gambling needs to be 
addressed at a national level including:
– EGM machine numbers: The national impact of 198,300 machines in Australia (PC, 
2010, p. 6) and the ramped up losses from those machines is considerable and one of 
the highest in the world.  The Commonwealth government should be concerned to 
reduce the number of EGMs in Australia and to determine where they are causing 
most harm and most need to be removed/reduced.
– State governments’ reliance on gaming tax (losses) revenue and the inefficacy of 
harm minimisation measures as demonstrated by growth in revenue (losses) despite 
‘harm minimisation’ and ‘responsible gambling’ approaches announced by 
governments.
– The impact of current state-based licensing arrangements on detrimental social and 
economic community impacts of gambling, especially the concentration of machines 
in disadvantaged areas and regional cities and towns and the lack of sustainability of 
current gaming industry/government arrangements. 
– Safety concerns with gaming products as they are currently configured. The type of 
machines being used and their features that lack adequate consumer protection (see 
in particular Livingston and Woolley 2008).
– The lack of national venue-specific monitoring data (and transparency of same) on 
gaming losses by socio-economic area and by venue (see in particular Livingston and 
Woolley 2008) and in respect of such data, the need for an independent national 
institute to collect, monitor and report on such data.
– The need for a national approach to the issue of Industry duty of care and host 
responsibility issues as part of the ‘license to operate’ and the lack of transparency 
of industry information e.g., venue based revenues and expenditures, changes in 
stake etc.
– The lack of a national plan to down-scale the number of gaming machines and to 
regulate their effects on poor and disadvantaged communities. In the event of a
down-scaling of community based machines, the need to consider issues related to 
the need for community clubs in particular, to identify new more sustainable revenue 
raising strategies.
A key question is whether 10 per cent national average reliance of State Treasuries on 
gambling taxes (and more in some states) is unsustainable because this is based on taking 
revenues from disadvantaged communities and vulnerable people via platforms, products and 
venues by/which they are not afforded adequate protections.  A frequent observation in regard 
to various state taxes and charges is that near to election time, state land taxes and taxes on 
second properties are reduced in response to the urgings of a vocal minority while the rate of 
gambling taxes remain unchanged.  This only serves to increase the regressivity of gambling 
taxes overall, and because gambling taxes are not hypothecated, but go into general revenue, 
it is difficult to see how it can be claimed that disadvantaged communities receive 
proportionate benefits in return.  
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5. Policy initiatives and recommendations
5.1 An action plan for Australian national gambling governance and re-
regulation
This paper argues that it is important for the Commonwealth government to take a stronger 
leadership role on gambling reform. We argue Australia needs new policy and institutional 
architecture and an integrated National Action Plan for Gambling Governance and Re-
Regulation.  This should be under-pinned by a commitment to public health, prevention and 
early intervention.  The Action Plan draws on international best practice and on Australian 
gambling research evidence established over the last decade.
The reform agenda should encompass re-regulation by the national regulator, the Australian 
Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC), implementing new consumer protection 
and license-to-operate mandatory codes of practice for the gambling industry and with the 
ACCC liaising with the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) in relation to fraud and money 
laundering.  The Productivity Commission (PC) has gone some of the way with its 
recommendations on gaming machines, pre-commitment and its acknowledgment of a greater 
role for the Commonwealth34. But the PC report has overly long time frames for reforms (for 
example, waiting six years for universal pre-commitment phase-in appears overly sympathetic 
to the industry), it lacks an integrated national plan and does not address the politics of 
gambling reform.  With 10 years of inaction since the 1999 Productivity Commission report, 
it is time for the Commonwealth to act.
The Commonwealth needs to drive this agenda because State/Territory governments have 
proven they are too reliant on gambling taxes to institute reforms that will tackle the harms 
caused by gambling.  The States have become too reliant on funds that are generated by 
vulnerable groups and individuals, by unsafe gambling products and gambling industry 
practices that need to be reined in.  Gambling has become a structural issue that urgently 
needs a national policy and program response. 
In setting out a National Action Plan for Gambling Governance and Re-Regulation, we 
consider both the powers of the Commonwealth and the scope for intervention to achieve 
national standards in consumer protection and product safety, industry re-regulation, probity 
monitoring and nationally coordinated research. 
In Figure 5.1 (shown earlier as E-1) we summarise the proposed Commonwealth National 
Action Plan.  This outlines the objectives of reforms, the key actions and the new/reformed
institutional architecture for Commonwealth gambling governance and re-regulation. 
How might this re-direction in policy be funded? 
Other calls on State/Territory and Commonwealth funding (health, education, defence) and 
State’s reliance on gambling revenue, have contributed to the inertia on gambling reforms.
What is innovative about this paper is that we argue the national gambling reform agenda can 
be revenue-neutral.  Funding can be sourced from gambling itself – to finance new initiatives 
that assist states to re-structure their tax-revenue streams, that are safer and that help protect 
Australians from gambling-related harms.  In broad principle, this entails a wind-back in the 
more harmful gaming machine and casino forms of gambling; to the point where it may again 
be considered truly recreational – as claimed by the gambling industry.
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Figure 5.1
National Action Plan for Gambling Governance and Re-Regulation
Notes
** Re-regulation would include licence to operate, mandated industry codes of practice, employee duty of care, host responsibility.
: * Recommended by Productivity Commission 2009.
*** Incorporate data from national player tracker system, new Commission to set research agenda, publication of research and publication 
of audit reports.
**** National Gambling Fund run as an independent charity.
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R1:  We recommend the establishment of a National Gambling Fund to be financed by 2 
per cent levy on the gambling industry and a new national lottery.
These two components of a National Gambling Fund are set out below. 
1.  Revenue from a new Commonwealth tax of 2 per cent of net gambling revenue on the 
grounds of the under-taxation of the industry  
Set at 2 per cent of net gambling revenue, a national levy on net gambling revenue would 
yield approximately $378 million annually (or 2 per cent of $19 billion player losses or profit 
on 2008/09 figures cited by the Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 7)35.
A range of arguments can be put to justify increased taxation of the gambling industry at a 
national level.  With public discussion focused on the principle of the Commonwealth levying 
super-profits taxes, we argue the gambling industry has profited exponentially and should be 
subjected to a new national tax that will be used to render gambling safer and to wind-back 
states’ reliance on regressive forms of taxation.
The history of exponential growth in gambling industry profits over the past 20 years 
demonstrates the moral and ethical justification for the new tax as a form of super profits tax.  
Currently, the gambling industry has exacted numerous tax and other concessions from State 
governments (and from the Commonwealth with for example, casino high roller exemptions 
from GST and tax concessions granted to clubs), with the public bearing the opportunity cost 
of such lost revenues.  The reality of tax foregone provides an added economic justification 
for a new tax.
The Productivity Commission (2009) drew attention to the different tax treatment of casinos 
and clubs.  The Commission posed the question of whether such concessions are merited: 
The Commission seeks views on the practicability of exempting casinos from draft 
recommendation 9.1 in relation to their high rollers and international visitors (Productivity 
Commission 2009, p. XLIX).
The Allen Consulting (2009) report on “Casinos and the Australian Economy”, commissioned 
by the Australian Casino Association, draws attention to a range of inconsistencies in States’ 
taxation of gambling.  It illustrates the potential for arguing the casino industry is under-taxed 
and suggests the opportunity costs of concessions given to high rollers and international VIPs 
are in need of review.  Their report also observes that: “The casino tax rates imposed in
Macau are higher than those average taxes faced by Australian casinos” (Allen Consulting, 
2009, p. 91), the implication being that compared to a liberal gambling regime like Macau, 
Australia is losing out on casino tax.
With regard to State tax breaks given to clubs, the data on community benefit casts doubt on 
the tax concessions given to clubs and the overall low level of tax levied on gaming in clubs 
and hotels36. With regard to clubs, there is an argument that state tax concessions are not 
necessarily justified (Livingston 2007) and that hotel and club claims to community benefit 
from gambling need to be re-examined; on the basis that their main claim to such benefit is 
employment.  Employment should be regarded as a standard business cost rather than a
special benefit to the community.  With regard to jobs generated from gambling, we 
previously argued that gambling is a less efficient generator of job compared with retail and 
hospitality. 
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There is also the argument that because the public bears the costs of gambling-related harms, 
the gambling industry is under-taxed in terms of contributing to these costs.  Public access to 
evidence on the gambling industry is thin on the ground; and a full cost analysis of taxation of 
gambling compared to other ‘dangerous consumptions’ such as alcohol and tobacco is 
lacking.  The Allen Consulting (2009, p. 63) study concedes that gambling tax invites such 
comparisons37. As noted by the PC, on 1997/98 figures cited in its 1999 report, rates of 
taxation for gambling services were ‘lower than for tobacco, alcohol and petrol’ (PC 2009, p. 
2.13).  Clearly, taxes on dangerous consumptions such as these acknowledge the cumulative 
public costs of the harms that accompany legal access to such products.  To date, the longer 
term costs of gambling-related harms to governments and the community, have largely 
remained hidden and unquantified.  A full-cost recovery approach to gambling would justify 
an across-the-board additional national tax of 2 per cent.
2.  Funding derived from establishment of a new National Australian Lotteries Commission 
The second source of new revenue for the Commonwealth is via establishment of a new 
National Australian Lotteries Commission.
Lotteries have been shown to be one of the lesser harmful forms of gambling (PC, 2010, p. 2). 
They have a more effective tax rate than other forms of gambling (i.e., higher tax for a smaller 
amount of expenditure), and they are more efficient when owned by the government 
(Productivity Commission, 2009, p. 2.10).  Even though lotteries have higher rates of 
participation, they feature much less frequently than EGMs or casino gambling in terms of per 
capita gambling losses and problem gambling.  To illustrate this argument, the Victorian 2003 
prevalence study (Australian National University 2004, p. 53) found that 60 per cent of 
Victorians took a lottery ticket and 43.5 per cent played at 1-3 times a week and 65 per cent 
played at least monthly.  In comparison there are much lower participation rates for EGMs –
8.5 per cent played at least weekly and 30.5 per cent played at least monthly.  However, in 
terms of expenditure the average expenditure on lotteries is less ($107 per capita in 2005/6) 
compared with much higher average per capita expenditure on EGMs (at $663 in 2005/6).  
(Australian Gaming Council 2008, p. 2).  Moreover 84 per cent of problem gamblers in the 
Victorian survey nominated EGMs as their favourite form of gambling; and lotteries did not 
figure (ANU 2004, p. 92); data that is consistent with the findings of the Productivity 
Commission in 2010.
We therefore argue that revenue from a national lottery would be a more ‘sustainable’ form of 
gambling in terms of household expenditure.
A national lottery can be run on the model of other government-run lotteries. Successful 
models of government-operated lotteries can be found in the United Kingdom, where the 
National Lottery Commission38, funds community, heritage and parks initiatives from lottery 
revenue and Western Australia (an Australian model of a government-run lottery where all 
proceeds after costs go to community causes39). We propose that such a model be developed 
for Australia.  This would help raise the revenue needed to assist the States in weaning 
themselves off other forms of gambling revenue. 
It is proposed the first three years of revenue from both the new national gambling levy and 
new national lottery revenue be ear-marked for State gambling reliance reduction incentive 
payments from the National Gambling Fund, after which they could be re-directed to other 
public expenditure.  This would entail using one less harmful form of gambling (i.e., lotteries) 
to down-scale state fiscal dependence on other, much more harmful forms (i.e., casino and 
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EGM gambling). Such a scheme would assist in the transition for states to re-structure their 
revenue sources – but it would not be appropriate to compensate industry. 
In addition to these two major funding reforms to finance a National Gambling Fund, a range 
of other reforms are needed to address the incentives the States currently have to raise revenue 
from gambling and to provide greater protections to consumers.
In particular, 
R2:  We recommend modifying the funding formula used by the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission to ensure that state governments have an incentive to reduce their reliance 
on revenue from gambling related sources. 
Section 96 of the Australian Constitution allows the Commonwealth Parliament to ‘grant 
financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit’.  
The principle of Commonwealth transfers to the States is well established in view of 
Australia’s “vertical fiscal imbalance” whereby the Commonwealth collects more from 
Commonwealth taxation than it directly needs; and the States raise less than what they need.  
So the Commonwealth has considerable financial power over the states and has a number of 
fiscal equalisation measures for redistributing funds to the States/Territories – a matter of 
much vexation to states over the years.  Section 109 also gives Commonwealth laws priority 
over state laws where they overlap.
The Commonwealth makes three broad types of payments to the States (based on 2009/10 
figures):
• National Specific Purpose Payments (SPPs) ($25.8 billion); 
• Three types of National Partnership Payments – project payments, facilitation 
payments and reward payments ($24.3 billion); and 
• General Revenue Assistance, consisting mainly of GST payments ($41.8 billion).40
It is the last category, General Revenue Assistance which would be the source of adjustments 
to the Commonwealth Grants Commission formula for distribution of GST sourced payments 
to States/Territories (to be funded from the National Gambling Fund).
Such Commonwealth intervention would be consistent with the line of reasoning confirmed in 
the Work Choices High Court decision41 which reinforced a trend to Commonwealth 
intervention in national interest matters, and more generally, Australia’s ‘managerial 
federalism’.42
It is also consistent with the trend towards more directive interventions from the 
Commonwealth in line with ‘conditional federalism’.
The result is growing support for a modern form of the federation which might be described 
as ‘conditional federalism’. ‘Conditional’ in the sense that it should be maintained as a 
system of government so long as it meets the conditions necessary for an efficient national 
economy; also, because its operation should be regulated by ‘conditions’ imposed by the 
central government (Griffith 2009, p. 2 citing Anderson).
There is a role for COAG in the reform agenda, where it should be recognised that the 
Ministerial Council that deals with Gambling (and the ‘thin’ national research agenda) has not 
been effective in addressing issues of consumer protection or the reduction of harms from 
gambling.  The COAG Reform Council, established in 2007, which reports to the Prime 
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Minister as Chair of COAG, could play a role in driving the Commonwealth vision on 
gambling.
The Council’s stated aims are to strengthen accountability for the achievement of results 
through independent and evidenced-based monitoring, assessment and reporting of the 
performance of all governments. (Griffith, 2009 p. 14).
The COAG website outlines a relevant task of the Council whereby it could be a vehicle for 
mediating the settings on State’s performance on gambling revenue reliance reduction and the 
compensation payments paid to the States.  The Council could:
independently assess whether milestones and performance benchmarks have been achieved 
by governments, under various National Partnerships, before an incentive payment is made 
to reward nationally significant reforms or service delivery improvements (the Council is 
responsible for assessments under six National Partnerships in the health and education 
sectors; and under the National Partnership Agreement to Deliver a Seamless National 
Economy, which includes 36 streams of business regulation and competition reform) (cited 
by Griffith, 2009, p.14)43.
This would entail the Commonwealth initiating changes to the Grants Commission formula 
adding incentives for State governments to reduce their reliance on gambling taxes or suffer 
reductions in Commonwealth grants44
 
. 
The formula used by the Commonwealth Grants Commission to distribute pooled funds, is 
based on the previous five years data on movements in the relative revenue raising capacities 
of the States and the relative costs of providing services45.  For example, strong growth in the 
Western Australian and Queensland economies due to mining and resources resulted in those 
Sates being assessed as requiring less than average per capita distribution from the national 
pool of funds46 (Commonwealth Grants Commission 2008). The pool ($49 billion in 
2006/07) is important to State budgets; constituting 71 per cent of funds provided to states by 
the Australian Government.47
The formula is re-assessed every five years, with the next reassessment due in 2010.  To date, 
the formula for redistribution of funds has focused on measures of relative age, Indigeneity, 
wealth, degree of urbanisation and total population of states and the relative cost of providing 
services.  New data has been incorporated on road length to accommodate costs of rural 
arterial roads.  
There is potential for the formula to put a punitive weighting on state revenue derived from 
gambling as currently the formula includes both sources of revenue that might be considered 
progressive (stamp duty on conveyances, land revenue and payroll tax) and regressive 
taxation such as gambling.  In the current formula, there is no consideration that regressive 
revenue such as gambling taxes rely for an estimated 40-60 per cent on losses from problem 
gamblers and generate increased use of hospital and medical (GP and other) services which 
involve a high degree of cost shifting to the Commonwealth. 
How might funds be apportioned to the States?
Proxy measures of States’ progress in reducing the harms from gambling could include a 
formula based on a range of measures.  These could include:
• reduction in the number of gaming machines at a State-level;
• reduction in gaming machine intensity (bet limits and hourly loss rate);
• reduction in State average per capita gaming and casino gambling losses;
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• reduction in revenue evaluated as a result of harm reduction strategies (given that 
problem gamblers contribute an estimated 42.7 per cent of revenue);
• reduction in proportionate state-dependency on gambling-derived taxes (this could 
include Commonwealth limits on permitted revenue from different gambling types) 
and would cover the situation of the Northern Territory where internet betting 
agencies located in the Territory inflate total gambling figures.
R3:  We recommend new national consumer protection and product safety standards.
A new national system of consumer protection would be advanced through modifying the 
national consumer protection laws to implement the Productivity Commission’s 
recommendations for a new national generic consumer law and a national universal player 
tracking/monitoring system used to monitor policy as well as venue-level interventions. 
The Commonwealth needs to lead on:
• implementing a national generic consumer law in line with the Productivity 
Commission (2008) recommendations;
• declaring gambling a ‘nationally significant issue’ with regard to a new role for the 
ACCC as a tough, impartial, national regulator of gambling focused on applying the 
consumer provisions in the Trade Practices Act;
• having the MCCA (Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs) implement a new 
national framework specifically directed to strengthening consumer protection in 
‘dangerous consumptions’ products (alcohol, tobacco, gambling); addressing hours 
of availability, accessibility, licensing conditions, host responsibility to customers 
and duty of care to employees; and
• initiating a national inquiry into the hours of operation of non-casino gambling 
venues with mandatory 8 hour shut down and mandatory 6 hour shut down of 
casinos as a violence/alcohol harm reduction strategy; and to implement smoking 
bans in all areas including international high roller precincts as a public health 
provision.  (This could be justified under the Productivity Commission 2008 
consumer Policy Framework recommendations to use COAG as the mechanism for 
industry-specific consumer regulation) (2008. p. 3).
Currently, consumer protections in gambling are weak, easily circumvented and unenforced.  
Of relevance to gambling, the 2008 Productivity Commission Consumer Policy Review
highlighted:
• ‘the perception in some quarters that consumer policy has been a low priority for the 
Australian Government’ (p. 32);
• the need to improve the consumer policy framework to assist and empower 
consumers, including disadvantaged and vulnerable consumers (p. vii), who may 
have increased in number (due to increased product complexity and demographic 
changes such as population ageing (p. 6);
• problems with the current system that point to the need for the Australian 
Government, through the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) to ‘be responsible for enforcing the product safety provisions nationally’ (p. 
2);
• ‘The new law should include a provision voiding ‘unfair’ contract terms that have 
caused consumer detriment’ (p. 2);
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• ‘Responsibility for regulating the provision of consumer credit and related advice by 
finance brokers and other intermediaries should also be transferred to the Australian 
Government as soon as practicable, with ASIC as the primary regulator’ (p. 3);
• ‘The consumer policy framework should efficiently and effectively aim to: ensure 
consumers are sufficiently well-informed’… , ‘ensure that goods and services are 
safe and fit for purpose’, ‘prevent practices that are unfair or contrary to good faith’, 
‘meet the needs of those who, as consumers, are most vulnerable, or at greatest 
disadvantage’, ‘provide accessible and timely redress where consumer detriment has 
occurred’ and ‘promote proportionate, risk-based enforcement’ (p. 13);
• Differences across jurisdictions include where ‘catering for Indigenous consumers 
will be a greater issue’ (this is of relevance to the vulnerability of Indigenous people 
in casino gambling in the NT) (p. 13);
• ’the intrinsic case for introducing a single national generic consumer law applying 
across Australia is therefore compelling’ a ‘first step in developing a regulatory 
regime that better matches the increasingly national nature of consumer markets and 
commercial arrangements generally’ (p. 19);
• promotion of ‘a one regulator model’ (p. 20); where for nationally significant issues 
‘intrinsically, there is no reason why an appropriately tasked and resourced national 
regulator could not effectively apply the new law at the local level’ (p. 21);
• the need to review ‘unfair contract terms that cause material detriment to consumers’ 
(p. 35) and review unconscionability provisions in generic consumer law (p. 34), and 
redress mechanisms, as applied to gambling; and
• generally, the need to address consumer redress mechanisms, better consumer 
information and education and enhanced consumer input into policy making 
(Fitzgerald et al 2008). 
R4  We recommend the introduction of a range of new product safety standards to 
ensure that gambling consumers are protected from dangerous machines in the same 
way that automotive consumers are protected from dangerous vehicles. 
The recent Productivity Commission Gambling Inquiry submissions48 point to particular 
problems with poker machines. But as other forms of gambling approximate the platform for 
success in revenue-generation – continuous forms of mechanised gambling – then questions 
about consumer safety are also raised by racing, sports betting, some lottery products and 
contract for difference, which has escaped definition as gambling and is regulated under the 
Financial Services legislation.
The Productivity Commission final Gambling report (2010, p. 11.29-11.30) is strong on
acknowledging the need to reduce the toxicity of gaming machines as currently configured 
and their recommendations include:
• a maximum bet of $1 per button push (or $120 per hour) for all machines (although 
the PC approves of exemption to machines in high roller rooms and in VIP rooms at 
casinos);
• a lower ($20) cash input (with high roller and VIP exemptions) (PC, 2010, p. 11.1);
Worryingly, it assumes that such reforms would be implemented by state governments; 
although past inaction casts doubt on this. Much of the discussion on new protective machine 
features is tentative. 
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Re-regulating poker machines to make a difference should go further than the Productivity 
Commission recommendations to include both machine and venue reforms:
• Banning note acceptors on gaming machines; 
• Banning ATMs in gaming venues; 
• Reviewing venue hours (mandatory 8 hour break/shut-down in clubs and hotels; 6 
hours for casinos); 
• Introducing compulsory smart cards (or form of universal ID) linked to independent 
Central Monitoring System; and restricting gaming machine use to pre-registered 
users; 
• Slowing down the machines to a maximum loss of $100 per day; 
• Introducing a compulsory 10 minute cooling off period after 1 hour of continuous 
gambling; 
• Re-regulating casinos via mandated codes of practice (e.g., use CMS system for 
independent monitoring and player protection interventions); and 
• Putting in place indicators that measure the costs of gambling impacts-suicide, crime, 
debt in the community etc. 
A national system of consumer protection and new product safety standards need to be 
supported by reforms at the venue level and controls on interactive gambling.  
R5: We recommend reform to the provision of gambling provider’s license to operate to 
ensure that gambling providers have both a duty of care to their customers and a duty 
of care to their employees. And, as part of a new money laundering and fraud prevention 
strategy, gaming licensees should be required to demonstrate that they have taken adequate 
steps to ascertain the probity of any funds being gambled. 
Legislating Codes of Practice entails amending Commonwealth legislation to embrace 
operator license-to-operate to host responsibility to patrons and employer duty of care to 
gambling industry employees who are at high risk themselves for gambling problems. 
 
This would entail using corporations law to re-regulate gambling services provider’s license-
to-operate and duty of care to both customers (host responsibility) and employees (duty of 
care to employees wellbeing and safety).
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been the focus of several Australian parliamentary 
enquiries (e.g., the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services 
2006) and has come to encapsulate companies’ obligations to a wider range of stakeholders 
than shareholders.  The community demands this and so the challenge of regulation is to 
respond to community expectations and avoid capture by vested interests.  The 
Commonwealth needs to consider incorporating CSR reporting on duty of care and host 
responsibility into mandated legal corporate reporting obligations of gaming operators under 
national requirements including casinos and gambling in clubs and hotels.
Overseas jurisdictions have adopted CSR regulatory approaches aimed at consumer protection 
as part of corporate social responsibility, mandated codes of conduct and licence to operate. 
Switzerland, as part of their licensing requirements has required casinos to actively identify 
and prevent problem gambling since 200049. Recently, New Zealand has taken proactive 
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steps incorporated into legislation. In New Zealand, statutory requirements under the 
Gambling Act 2003 (section 3) which took effect from 1 July 2004, require gambling 
providers to develop a policy for identifying problem gamblers and ‘take all reasonable steps’ 
to implement the policy to identify actual or potential problem gamblers, provide information 
and advice, issue exclusion orders (even to those who do not identify themselves as problem 
gamblers but about whom staff continue to have concerns and refuse to permit excluded 
persons into gambling areas during the period of the exclusion50 (Gambling Commission New 
Zealand 2007). Under New Zealand Operating Procedures, three means of identifying actual 
or potential problem gamblers include:  casino staff’s use of the ‘casino signs’ for problem 
gambling’, third party notifications and self identification (Department of Internal Affairs 
2007).  Moreover the Gambling Commission (regulator) independently assesses casino Host 
Responsibility codes and audits compliance.
In Britain, the 2005 Gambling Act and Code of Practice operative from 1 September, 2007, 
(Section 2.3) requires licensees (hosts) to ‘take all reasonable steps to provide information on 
how to gamble responsibly and help for problem gamblers ’(Gambling Commission 2007).  
Section 2.4 requires Licensees to ‘put into effect policies and procedures intended to promote 
socially responsible gambling’, which must include specific policies and procedures in 
relation to ‘a commitment to and how they will contribute to research into prevention and 
treatment of problem gambling’, ‘to public education on the risks of gambling and how to 
gamble safely’ and ‘how they will contribute to the identification and treatment of problem 
gamblers’ (Gambling Commission 2007, 27). 
Holland Casino, the sole national government casino operator in The Netherlands, has 
implemented a Visitor Registration System, an Incident Registration System (with prompt 
detection of possible problem gamblers based on frequency of visits and on the floor 
observation) and a CCTV system of up to 250 cameras per casino (Holland Casino 2007).
International research has clarified the efficacy of venue managers adopting host 
responsibility and practical ways of identifying problem and at risk gamblers and of 
intervening as part of host responsibility expectations of a licence to operate (Alcock 2002; 
Delfabbro et al 2007; Kalajdzic 2007; Sasso and Kalajdzic 2007; Schellinck and Schrans 
2004; 2005; 2007; Hancock, Schrans and Schellinck 2008).
R6:  We recommend the ban on interactive gambling should be maintained and the 
National Finance Regulations used to ban ATMs and access to finance (cash or credit) 
within any gambling venue including casinos.  The Financial Services Act should be used 
to address problem gambling concerns with the rising popularity of ‘Contract for Difference’. 
The Commonwealth government should: 
• use National Finance Regulations to continue the ban on interactive (internet casino,
poker gaming and gaming machine) gambling until player protection systems are 
proven;  
• ban ATMs and access to finance (cash or credit) within any gambling venue 
including casinos; and  
• address problem gambling concerns with regard to on-line player safety with 
Contract for Difference (sometimes referred to as spread betting) regulated under the 
Financial Services Act). 
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Internet gambling is still a relatively small proportion of net gambling expenditure; with on-
line gambling accounting for approximately 6 per cent (Productivity Commission 2009, 2.12). 
Although estimates are difficult to make, they suggest that about 4 percent of the population 
(around 700,000 Australians) played online casino games in 2008 (Productivity Commission, 
2010, p. 15.16). The Productivity Commission has made the surprise recommendation to 
liberalise interactive gambling on the argument that it is happening anyway (Australians are 
accessing internet gaming sites) and that legalisation would afford players with more 
protection and prevent crime/fraud (curiously, the same arguments used previously when 
gaming machines were introduced).  Moreover, they argue on ‘cost-benefit grounds’ there are 
‘persuasive arguments to exempt online gambling providers from bans on credit cards’ 
(Productivity Commission 2010, p. 23). The Commission argues that pre-commitment and 
measures used to offer safety for telephone betting and internet wagering could be used for 
gambling more generally; but did not provide cogent evidence of how current systems deliver 
consumer safety. 
With regard to international competition rules, Australia has the capacity to restrict interactive 
gambling.  With regard to Australia’s obligations under the General Agreement on Trade in 
Services (GATT):
Australia has not made any market access or national treatment commitments on gambling 
services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). In other words, 
Australia has retained the capacity to restrict the access of foreign suppliers of gambling 
services, or to discriminate against them in favour of domestic suppliers. The only 
obligation of the Australian Government under GATS is that it must extend most-favoured 
nation treatment to any World Trade Organisation (WTO) Member (with the exception of 
New Zealand) (National Office for the Information Economy (NOIE) 2001, p. 33).
Overturning Australia’s internet gambling ban could put consumers at risk.  It would seem 
prudent to establish first, the effectiveness of player protection systems on other gambling 
modes and on forms of gambling currently permitted by internet, before changing the current 
arrangements.  One such provision is to adopt the UK Lottery Commission player protections 
of monitoring of patterns of play (e.g., detecting chasing losses) and placing limits on time 
and wallet load limits spent gambling on the internet.
R7:  We recommend the establishment of a new Independent National Gambling 
Research and Probity Commission funded by the National Gambling Fund. 
The Commonwealth should take the lead in introducing a national player tracking system
to identify abnormal playing patterns for all forms of gambling.  Such a player tracking 
system would enable individual player protections as well as providing a new source of data 
to monitor the extent of problem gambling.  Such data would assist in both policy 
development and fraud detection. 
In Australia, patterns of player activity on different forms of gambling is currently only 
available for casino and other loyalty tracking systems which are corporately owned, 
voluntary, largely confined to individual states and hidden from outside scrutiny.  What is 
needed is a national player tracking data system which enables individual player protections 
and which can be used to monitor location, gambling type, amounts being gambling for 
construction of geo-spatial gambling data (e.g., showing the amount gambled in 
disadvantaged areas and on what forms of gambling) for feed-back to regulators and policy 
makers and for use in fraud detection. 
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The proposal for a national player tracking system goes further than the Productivity 
Commission’s recommendation for ‘a universal player commitment scheme for gaming 
machines’,51 which in our view, should be extended to all forms of gambling and all 
platforms. 
Some Australian States have implemented trials of card-based play offing various player 
protection features.  Canada has advanced this technology and the Saskatchewan Gaming 
Corporation has implemented player protection intervention strategies based on player 
tracking systems, with interventions for identified problem and ‘at risk’ players (see Techlink 
2009).  Nova Scotia has led the world in its 2006 pilot of universal player tracking technology 
paired with opt-in pre-commitment, self exclusion and other provisions – currently under 
independent evaluation.52
 
The on-line networking of all EGMs in New Zealand was not 
prohibitively expensive and had the unexpected by-product of increasing revenue by one 
third.
The Independent National Gambling Research and Probity Commission should be responsible 
for the new national anti-fraud and anti-money laundering strategies including, inter alia,
analysis of the data collected from the proposed national player tracking system.  The 
Commission should have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Australian 
Crime Commission to ensure that gambling data is utilised in the fight against organised 
crime. 
 
National anti-fraud and anti-money laundering provisions should include: 
i) capacity to link consumer protection surveillance of national universal ID based 
national gambling machine and player tracking monitoring system across all forms of 
gambling, to be housed by an Independent National Gambling Research 
Commission;  
ii) enforceable links to national mandated codes of conduct related to venue obligations 
to ascertain the probity of funds being gambled; and 
iii) Use of player tracking data to detect crime and money laundering 
Independent research is essential to monitor reforms to the industry, for nationally 
consistent policy and to keep abreast of developments in the industry and consumer 
protections. 
 
Specifically, in regard to gambling research, the need for well-resourced, independent 
gambling research was emphasised in the Productivity Commission 1999 report and the lack 
of action on this recommendation was criticised in Chairman Gary Banks’ two updates (2002, 
2007).  The Commission’s 2010 final report reiterated these criticisms and was critical of the 
research agenda of Gambling Research Australia (PC, 2010, p. 39).   
 
The state and national research agenda lacks independence53, and research effort and funding 
has increasingly been directed towards non-contentious issues.  State regulators control the 
National Gambling Research Strategy agenda and they control state research programs as 
well, so they are able to influence both state and national research.  In short, the national 
research agenda has become impoverished and lacking in independence and relevance.
On the principle of independent oversight, the Canadian researchers Smith and Rubenstein 
(2009, p. 4-5) reinforce: 
In view of the complications related to offering commercial gambling, an independent 
commission with powers akin to those of an Ombudsman or Provincial Auditor seems a 
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suitable way to administer a gambling regulatory regime that is free of conflicting 
objectives and interests; open, consultative and informed by empirical research; and 
conducted in the public interest (Smith and Rubenstein, 2009, p. 4-5).
R8:  We recommend an MOU between the Australian Crime Commission and the (new) 
Independent National Gambling Research and Probity Commission regarding the use of 
player tracking data base to detect instances of money laundering and other ‘signs’ of 
criminal activity.
According to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission 
(2009), this would appear to be good practice:
(I)ntelligence has become a crucial law enforcement tool. Mr Neil Jenson, CEO of 
AUSTRAC, highlighted the importance of financial intelligence:…financial intelligence is 
critical to the fight against organised and serious crime. It is valuable for both operational 
and strategic purposes…[financial intelligence] information assists law enforcement to 
uncover previously undetected criminal activity and connections among crime groups as 
well as to identify emerging patterns and threats.
AUSTRAC plays a vital role in supporting the ACC and other law enforcement and 
security agencies through supplying the financial intelligence expertise needed for this 
approach. AUSTRAC’s ability to link financial data and cross-match information assists in 
detecting suspicious activity as it is evolving (Parliamentary Joint Committee on the 
Australian Crime Commission (2009. 5.93).
With land-based venues, staff can observe patrons and log details or potential ‘signs’ of 
money laundering.  Given the comments above from the Crimes Commission, liberalising 
internet gambling may put consumers further at risk; rather than as claimed, making it easier 
to protect them.
Current AUSTRAC notification requirements for reporting of transactions over $10,000 may 
also need review as might the reported capacity of note acceptors on some mechanised 
baccarat machines to define each note as a separate bet (thus enabling untracked amounts of 
cash to be fed into machines).
With the increasing sophistication of technology, liberalising interactive gambling may put 
people more, rather than less at risk.  As stated by the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) 
(2009) report on Organised Crime in Australia:
• Money laundering is a diverse and complex criminal activity used to disguise the 
origin of criminal profits.  It involves the placement of illicit profits into the 
legitimate economy to conceal its origins. It is a major component of virtually all 
criminal activity and affects the Australian community in numerous ways (p. 8).
• Money laundering can include processes involving transfers to financial institutions 
in countries where Australian law enforcement has limited visibility, transfers to 
other asset types which cannot be easily traced, gambling and the use of money 
remitters.  The ability to effectively and discreetly launder money is a key capability 
for criminal networks.  In Australia, only a small proportion of the estimated 
proceeds of crime are currently detected, restrained and recovered. More and more 
organised crime groups are becoming involved in money laundering, either directly 
or by employing the services of facilitators with specialist knowledge (p. 9).
• A wide range of techniques are used by criminal groups within Australia to launder 
illicit funds. … Other money laundering methods involve professionals who are 
employed by criminals to work around the regulations and controls in the regulated 
financial sector.  These facilitators use their specialist knowledge and expertise to
exploit legal loopholes or find opportunities for criminals.  Other criminals may use 
a number of people to carry out small transactions or cash smuggling to avoid 
attracting law enforcement attention (p. 9).
discovery
application
excellence 63
Page 48 Risky business:  why the Commonwealth needs to take over gambling regulation
August 2010 Hancock and O’Neil
• Many serious and organized criminals are increasingly using new technologies to 
support their activities.  Communications technology helps provide new targets and 
improved security for criminals (p. 10).
• Technology and fraud technology can underpin a range of organised criminal 
activities.  It can be used to disguise communication between criminals, create false 
identities or mask a criminal’s true identity.  This can facilitate frauds through the 
collection of key 
• Identity or banking details by persuading people anywhere in the world to provide 
financial details, or to carry out financial transactions on behalf of criminals.  It can 
also be used to seek illicit profits directly through computer hacking or via other 
communication devices.  Computer vandalism and viruses may also be used to 
disrupt business.  Rapid changes in how people use communications devices are 
creating numerous opportunities for criminals.  This sets an ongoing challenge for 
law enforcement to maintain and develop the skills and expertise needed to 
effectively counter technology-enabled criminal activities.  Second Life, MySpace, 
YouTube, Facebook as well as increased use of internet banking and wireless 
technologies are changing how people communicate, and creating opportunities for 
criminals to infiltrate and influence vulnerable members of society (p. 10).
• The use of legitimate activities by organised crime groups may disguise criminal 
activity and making it difficult for law enforcement, government and industry to 
identify the criminal component (Australian Crime Commission. 2009. p. 14-15).
5.2 Conclusion
In the context of the global financial crisis, significant household debt, rising interest rates, 
significant unemployment and financial hardship impacting on Australian communities, there 
is a need for Commonwealth intervention to protect vulnerable Australians from the harms 
caused by gambling and to institute new obligations on venues and licensees/operators as a 
matter of national priority. But there are political, economic and structural barriers to reform.
We argue gambling needs to be treated as a special consumer ‘dangerous consumption’, in 
view of the harms it potentially causes and the mounting national evidence of harms and their 
avoidability – given appropriate regulation.  While the States and Territories have control of 
gambling, the costs to the community will continue to grow.
Gambling has become a structural adjustment issue where Australia’s federalist structure and 
the divisions of responsibilities between the Commonwealth and the States/Territories has 
become a sticking point, and a barrier to reform.  This publication is about why the 
Commonwealth should act – because the States have their hands in the till.
This paper proposes an alternative, that the Commonwealth lead a brave, new approach to 
addressing the harms caused by gambling and that this can be done via adoption of a National 
Action Plan on Gambling Governance and Re-Regulation underpinned by a public health risk 
and prevention strategy.  This would use levers within the Commonwealth jurisdiction
including fiscal incentives to reduce State/Territory reliance on regressive gambling taxes.  
The Commonwealth needs to lead on re-regulating gambling nationally via changes to 
consumer protection laws and use of Commonwealth financial, ACCC, Australian Crimes 
Commission and corporations legislation; and giving incentives to the States via the Grants 
Commission. 
The Commonwealth could introduce a renewed national-Commonwealth-led approach 
through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG).  COAG has committed State and 
Federal governments to a united commitment to social inclusion and improving outcomes for 
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disadvantaged (and all Australians) in education, literacy and numeracy, health, housing, jobs 
and social infrastructure.  Other initiatives include the National Partnership on Early 
Childhood Education Reform, National Partnership on Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN), 
National Partnership on Low Socio-Economic School Communities, and the 2008 COAG 
agreement to six ambitious targets for Closing the Gap between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous people. 
There is a strong argument for using COAG to drive national compliance within a new 
national consumer protection National Action Plan for Gambling Governance and Re-
Regulation.  A Commonwealth regulator could respond to local issues from a national 
perspective (the Productivity Commission commented on the ‘capacity of national dispute 
resolution services – such as the Banking and Financial Services Ombudsman – to deal with 
local issues’ (Fitzgerald et al 2008, p. 21).
We argue the Commonwealth government needs to intervene to protect the ‘common-wealth’ 
or public interest by using its overarching powers and by exercising its jurisdictional 
responsibility in consumer protection, corporations powers, longer-term fiscal sustainability, 
health and well being, and reduced costs of gambling harms to governments and the 
community.  There is wide recognition that Australia’s federalist structure (where gambling 
has been seen as a state responsibility), has led to States doing little that would jeopardise 
their reliance on gambling taxes.
In setting out a National Action Plan for Gambling Governance and Re-Regulation, we 
consider both the powers of the Commonwealth and the scope for intervention to achieve 
national standards in consumer protection and product safety, industry re-regulation, fraud 
and money laundering reduction, probity monitoring and nationally coordinated research.
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Appendix 1
Evidence of under-taxation of the gambling industry
A range of arguments can be put to justify increased taxation of the gambling industry. 
The Productivity Commission 1999 report argued that in 1997/98 rates of taxation for 
gambling services were lower than for tobacco, alcohol and petrol.  Public access to evidence 
on the gambling industry is thin on the ground and a full cost analysis of taxation of gambling 
compared to other ‘dangerous consumptions’ such as alcohol and tobacco is lacking.  But 
even the Allen Consulting (2009) study commissioned by the Australian Casino Association 
concedes that gambling tax invites such comparison.54 There is some emerging evidence of 
the lack of inter-state consistency in gambling taxation, that taxes have decreased for some 
forms of gambling55 and there are grounds for arguing that the opportunity costs (i.e., lost
revenue) from concessions to the gambling industry need to be examined. 
The Productivity Commission describes how clubs and casinos are treated differently in terms 
of taxation:
‘in NSW, clubs do not pay revenue taxes on the first $1 million of EGM revenue and are 
refunded their GST contributions for up to $200 000 of EGM revenue.(Productivity 
Commission 2009, p. 2.22)
‘- Clubs generally face lower gambling taxes than hotels, and often have greater 
entitlements to EGMs. A possible rationale for the treatment of clubs is that they are not for 
profit, ‘member-owned’ bodies that might have stronger incentives to address consumer 
problems associated with gambling than for-profit businesses.
The Commission also received many submissions from clubs — or those supported by club 
gambling revenue, stressing their role in sustaining local communities —through 
sponsorship of local community and sports groups.
However, the arguments for the present concessional treatment of clubs are not 
straightforward, because these concessions involve forgone tax revenue.
Government could have used this forgone revenue to fund services valued by the whole 
community and not just those selected by club management, a point also made by 
McMillen (sub. 223, pp. 13–14).
- Casinos are also subject to varying rules in relation to taxation and machine caps— but 
they represent a much smaller share of aggregate spending, are more often aimed at 
different customers (high-rollers and tourists) and, due to their destination nature, are not as 
ubiquitous as hotels and clubs (Productivity Commission 2009, 3.12).
Working from Victorian data published on the Department of Justice website, Livingston 
argued on the basis of analysis of 559 statements representing 523 hotel and club venues on 
2005/06 data that:
It is clear that the category ‘employment expenses’ represents by far the single greatest area 
of expenditure, providing 67.7 per cent of hotel claims, 58.8 per cent of club claims, and
62.8 per cent of all claims. For clubs, the second most significant area of claimed 
expenditure was for fixed assets (13.8 per cent), and for hotels the second largest category 
by proportion was that of ‘direct and indirect costs’ (16 per cent). The third largest category 
for clubs was ‘direct and indirect costs’ (10.9 per cent) and for hotels ‘fixed assets’ (14.7 
per cent). For clubs, the combined categories of ‘gifts of funds’, ‘sponsorships’ and ‘gifts of 
goods’ amounted to 4.1 per cent of the amounts claimed, and for hotels, 0.7 per cent. 
Overall these categories amounted to 2.6 per cent of the amounts claimed. The categories of 
‘voluntary services’ and ‘volunteer expenses’ totalled 7.4 per cent of claimed club 
community benefit expenditure and effectively 0 per cent of hotel claims. Overall these 
categories accounted for 4.2 per cent of claimed community benefit. (Livingston 2007, p. 4)
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The categories of ‘employment expenses’, ‘fixed assets’, ‘subsidised activities’ and ‘direct 
and indirect costs’ amounted to 88.1 per cent of club community benefit claims, 99.2 per 
cent of hotel claims and 93.2 per cent of all claims (Livingston 2007, p. 4).
In Victoria, EGM tax is set at one third of net revenue (including the GST component); with 
hotels paying an extra 8.3 per cent contributing to the Community Support Fund (which clubs 
are exempt from on the assumption of benefits to members and the community). The data on 
community benefit casts doubt on the tax concessions given to the industry and the level of 
tax.
As pointed out in the Productivity Commission report at Appendix E, on Tax Concessions, 
the lack of reporting and of available data on the income and expenditure of not for profits 
makes estimates of the cost of concessions difficult:  (costed at $518 million for New South 
Wales; $77 million for Victoria; $121 million for Queensland and $8 million for South 
Australia and not withstanding other concessions on land tax and payroll tax granted to not 
for profits (Productivity Commission 2009, E-9).
With regard to clubs, there is an argument that state tax concessions are not necessarily 
justified (Australian Broadcasting Commission 2010; Campbell 2010; Livingston 2007; 
Saulwick 2010) and that hotel and club claims to community benefit from gambling need to
be re-examined. 
In Victoria, reports of a joint venture between Australian Leisure and Hospitality Group 
(ALH) and Woolworths has exposed deals to operate over 660 poker machines in 10 venues 
registered as clubs; thus gaining the lower club tax rate of 25 per cent rather than the 33.3 per 
cent tax rate for commercial operations.  ‘Under the deals, ALH owns the venues and leases 
out the pokies area to the clubs.  It then charges the clubs rent and a management fee to 
operate the machines.  But Victorian Commission for Gambling Regulation documents, 
which are publicly available, indicate the lion's share of the revenue goes to ALH.  But in 
many cases the detailed accounts of rent, management fees and dividends paid to the clubs, as 
they relate to pokies revenues, are not available or are kept secret by ALH and the VCGR 
(Campbell 2010).’
In New South Wales, Lateline (ABC 2010) focused on the $3.3b New South Wales poker 
machine clubs industry and questioned whether the $1.2b of claimed national social 
contribution or ‘social work’ by clubs is exaggerated.  With New South Wales clubs’ claims 
based on figures it put to IPART (the Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal), the CEO 
of IPART argued that ‘around 90 per cent of that figure would be hard-pressed to qualify as 
social work’.
Paul Benhet argued clubs spend on marketing three to four times the amount donated to 
community causes.  The program queried whether the claimed New South Wales clubs’ 
claimed community benefits of $811 million a year are justified when upon examination, 
$676 million is for goods and services provided to club patrons, such as discounted food and 
drink, sporting facilities and room hire.  More realistically, $44 million was estimated as the 
value of volunteer hours provided by club members and staff and only $91 million of the total 
was directly donated to charities and sporting groups in 2007.  Betty Con Walker, a former 
senior New South Wales Treasury official argued the $91 million the clubs say they give to 
charity ‘needs closer scrutiny’ and is closer to $30 million.  She argued on the basis of 
government budget papers, that the costing of the club industry concession at $600 million for 
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this financial year is a cost to government of revenue foregone for expenditure on areas like
health and education.
Not for profit organisations, registered as clubs gain exemption from income tax earned on 
revenue from members.  The Henry Tax Review is said to be raising concerns about the 
income tax concessions given to clubs; resulting in unfair competition between clubs and 
local private firms.  ‘Clubs, many of which have developed multimillion-dollar property 
portfolios and recreational facilities, do not pay income tax on money earned from members.  
Sports clubs are also exempt for income from non-members’ (Saulwick, 2010).
The Allen Consulting (2009) report on Casinos and the Australian Economy, draws attention 
to a range of inconsistencies in States’ taxation of gambling and also illustrates the potential 
for arguing the casino industry is under-taxed, and that the opportunity cost of concessions 
given to high rollers and international VIPs is in need of review.
Casinos represent 17 per cent of total gambling expenditure and ‘in 2007/08, gaming 
activities comprised 78.2 per cent of total revenue, followed by food and beverage sales’ 
(Allen Consulting, 2009, p. 9).  In 2007/08, revenues from EGMs comprised 41 per cent of 
total casino gaming revenue ($1299 million).  Table gaming revenue made up 40 per cent of 
casinos gaming revenue ($1271 million) and international VIP program players comprised 18 
per cent of revenue (Allen Consulting, 2009, p. 11).  ‘Gaming expenditures by international 
VIP program players totalled $553 million in 2007/08.  It is estimated that casinos spent a 
further $65 million to attract these players and their entourages, who are estimated to have 
spent $121 million in Australia on non-casino goods and services’ (Allen Consulting 2009, p. 
14).
Their report made the following points: 
• Casinos in Victoria, Queensland, ACT, Western Australian and the Northern 
Territory (SkyCity Darwin only) 7 are subject to a flat tax according to player 
characteristics.  These jurisdictions charge a higher tax rate on gaming revenues from 
regular players than on revenues from international VIP program players (p. 76).
• South Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory (Lasseters Casino only) apply 
a flat tax to table gaming.  In South Australia and the Northern Territory the tax 
revenue base is gross revenue from table gaming.  In Tasmania the revenue base is 
specified as gross profit, however the definition specified in the Gaming Control Act 
1993 (Tasmania) is the same as gross revenue56
• As with table gaming tax, States and Territories differ in their approaches to EGM 
tax.  Western Australia, Queensland and the ACT impose EGM tax according to 
player characteristics, charging higher rates for regular players than international VIP 
program players.  In 2007/08, taxes on international VIP program players collected 
$56.2 million (p. 76).
(p. 76)
• Victoria imposes a super tax on table gaming revenue, with different rates applying 
according to player characteristics.  Crown Melbourne is subject to a super tax of 1 
per cent per each $20 million of gaming revenue from regular players above $500 
million up to a maximum of 20 per cent on player loss over $880 million.  For 
international VIP program players, the casino is required to pay a super tax of 1 per 
cent for each $20 million of gaming revenues over $160 million, up to a maximum of 
12.25 per cent on gaming revenues over $380 million (p. 77).
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• In the majority of states, EGM gaming revenues are subject to the highest tax rates in 
hotels, followed by clubs, and then by casinos.  However in most jurisdictions, the 
EGM tax rates imposed on hotels and clubs are marginal progressive tax rates based 
on gaming revenues such that some venues will pay lower rates of tax than casinos 
(p. 77) 57
• Some States and Territories impose other taxes on gaming in casinos that are not 
categorised in the previous sections.  These include the reintroduction of the New 
South Wales high roller program, and taxes on international VIP program players in 
the Northern Territory and the ACT.  Star City’s international VIP program was 
reactivated on 1 January 2006 after having ceased in 2001 due to its risky nature. 
Under an agreement with the New South Wales Government, a non-refundable 
instalment of $3 million is paid in January and July of each year, and an additional 
10 per cent duty applies to gross gaming revenue in excess of $60 million (p. 77).
.
• However, the regressive elements of the GST remain in casino programs such as 
high roller rebates, which are outside the scope of the GST.  Further, other taxes 
specific to casinos that may increase the burden on gamblers have not been lifted to 
compensate for the introduction of the GST (p. 84). 
• Currently, EGMs are taxed at 20 per cent of gaming revenue and table games and 
keno are taxed at 18 per cent of gaming revenue.  This year the Queensland 
Government announced an increase in taxes from July 2009 on EGMs in casinos 
only.  The tax rates for gaming machines in Conrad Treasury and Conrad Jupiters 
Gold Coast will increase to 30 per cent (from 20 per cent) and to 20 per cent (from 
10 per cent) for gaming machines in Jupiters Townsville and Reef Hotel Casino 
(Allan Consulting Group 2009).
The Allen Consulting report also draws attention to a number of casino tax changes since 
1999.
Changes to State and Territory tax arrangements
There have been a number of significant changes to State and Territory government gaming 
tax arrangements since the 1999 PC inquiry, with the key changes identified below.
Western Australia
In 1999 Western Australia’s Burswood Entertainment Complex was taxed at 15 per cent of 
gaming revenues.  Currently, EGMs are taxed at 20 per cent of gaming revenue and table 
games and keno are taxed at 18 per cent of gaming revenue.
Queensland
This year the Queensland Government announced an increase in taxes from July 2009 on 
EGMs in casinos only. The tax rates for gaming machines in Conrad Treasury and Conrad 
Jupiters Gold Coast will increase to 30 per cent (from 20 per cent) and to 20 per cent (from 10 
per cent) for gaming machines in Jupiters Townsville and Reef Hotel Casino.
Tasmania
In Tasmania, future changes to the casino tax arrangements will see a single flat tax rate of 
25.88 per cent applied to gross revenues from casino-based EGMs from 1 July 2013.
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New South Wales
New South Wales introduced a single marginal tax rate scale in July 2008.  This tax rate 
applies to both table and electronic casino gaming and is calculated according to gaming 
revenue.  In 2008/09 the base rate is 24.13 per cent (for revenues between $0 and $600 000), 
with a top marginal rate of 47.13 per cent (for revenues greater than $720 million), with rates 
to increase annually to 2012/13.  In 2012/13 the base rate in New South Wales will be 25.50 
per cent (for revenues between $0 and $675,000), with the top rate to be 50 per cent (for 
revenues greater than $810.6 million).  From 1 July 2013 the New South Wales tax rates will 
stay constant, with the bands to increase annually in line with CPI.  New South Wales is the 
only jurisdiction with a marginal tax scale on table gaming (Allen Consulting 2009, p. 74).
The report also makes the observation that ‘The casino tax rates imposed in Macau are higher 
than those average taxes faced by Australian casinos’ (Allen Consulting, 2009, p. 91).
In its report, the Productivity Commission posed the question of whether continuing 
concessions are merited 
The Commission seeks views on the practicability of exempting casinos from draft 
recommendation 9.1 in relation to their high rollers and international visitors (Productivity 
Commission 2009, p. XLIX).
To add to these arguments of under-taxation, there is also the moral argument of the 
exponential profits enjoyed over the last 20 years by the gambling industry; while the public 
and community costs of gambling are not factored into the costs of industry license-to-
operate.
On the basis of the arguments above, we argue there is justification for increasing taxation on 
the gambling industry.  We emphasise the argument with regard to hotels, that they ‘farm’ 
machines more intensively and generate substantial harms which need to be paid for, that 
clubs and hotels have benefited from a range of tax and other concessions in the past that have 
enabled them to build up infrastructure and member facilities and that the harms caused by 
gambling and the costs to the community merit tougher taxation.  With regard to casinos, the 
intensity of operations and lack of transparency over government-granted concessions, mean 
they should be included in arguments for a new across-the-board tax on the gambling industry 
as proposed in the Action Plan.
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End Notes                                                             
1 This study, while embodying the best efforts of the investigators is but an expression of the 
issues considered most relevant, and neither the SA Centre for Economic Studies, Michael 
O’Neil, nor the Adelaide or Flinders Universities and neither the Alfred Deakin Research 
Institute, Linda Hancock nor Deakin University can be held responsible for any 
consequences that ensue from the use of the information in this report.  Neither the SA 
Centre for Economic Studies, Michael O’Neil, nor the Adelaide or Flinders Universities; nor 
the Alfred Deakin Research Institute, Linda Hancock nor Deakin University, make any 
warranty or guarantee regarding the contents of the report, and any warranty or guarantee is 
disavowed except to the extent that statute makes it unavoidable.
2 See Peatling (2010). The Productivity Commission reports ‘There were 198 300 electronic 
gaming machines (EGMs) in Australia in 2009, with 97 065 machines in NSW alone, and
only 1750 in Western Australia’ (2010, p. 6).
3 See Smith (2000, p. 131). 
4 Australian National University (2004, p. 129).
5 See Franklin (2007).
6 See Productivity Commission (2010, p. 2)
7 The Productivity Commission (2010, p. 2) found: ‘The risks of problem gambling are low 
for people who only play lotteries and scratchies, but rise steeply with the frequency of 
gambling on table games, wagering and, especially, gaming machines’.
8 The global gambling complex draws on Galbraith’s (New Industrial State) analysis of the 
military-industrial complex, which summarised the mix of corporate, military and 
government interests during the Vietnam War.  The global gambling complex refers to the 
cosy cabal of interests that unites government, gambling providers (clubs/hotels/casinos), the 
gaming industry and transnational gambling industry corporations. 
9 Dunn describes ‘contract for difference’ (CFD), as ‘an equity derivative that represents a 
theoretical order to buy or sell a certain number of shares. The price of a CFD is derived 
from the spread – the highest buying price (offer) and lowest selling price (bid) that is quoted 
on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) – so the value of the CFD mirrors the share price.’
‘An investor buying a “long” CFD benefits from a rise in the share price, while a “short” 
CFD gains its benefit from a fall in the share price. The investor’s profit or loss is 
determined by the difference between the opening and closing price, with the difference paid 
in cash at the close of the contract. ….. CFDs are offered on more than 400 companies listed 
on the ASX, but they are not a listed product or an ASX product….. The punter doesn’t 
transact on the ASX: the bet is made with the bookmaker. The bookie’s spread will be based 
on the current selling quote and a future buying price that it determines…..’
‘The investor uses this price to bet on the direction of the share price or index value. If he 
thinks the price will rise, he makes an up bet from the quoted offer (the selling price); if he 
thinks the price will fall, he makes a down bet from the quoted bid (the buying price). ….
Spread betting allows investors to back their judgement in financial markets, without having 
to buy or sell the shares. You can place a “bet” on which way the price will move. You never 
actually own the shares: you’re only interested in the price movement. Clients can bet on 
shares going up as well as down…. The Australian Taxation Office says that the issue of the 
tax status of spread betting is “still being looked at” ‘(Dunn 2007, np).
10 As Noted by the Productivity Commission: 
‘Policy measures often lack ‘bite’. Governments have introduced many measures to address 
the harms associated with gambling machines, but the effectiveness of many of these is 
questionable. This includes requirements for:
• short periods of machine shutdowns. These typically occur in the early hours of the 
morning. They allow premises to be cleaned and maintained, but produce few obvious 
harm minimisation benefits.
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• lowering the maximum bet limit from $10 to $5. If played at the fastest allowed rate, that 
means that the value of bets laid per hour will have fallen from $12 000 to $6000 (and 
expected losses down to $600 from $1200 an hour, which remains very high). Some 
jurisdictions have maintained the limit at $10.
• reducing the value of notes that gamblers can insert at any one time into a machine from 
$100 to $50 — but retaining the capacity to insert note after note
• _ reduced cash input levels, such as from $10 000 to $1000. In this case, a player could 
still insert twenty $50 notes consecutively into the machine. (Again, some jurisdictions 
have retained the $10 000 limit.)
• _ ATM withdrawal limits of $200 per transaction — but problem gamblers can go back
time after time, subject to the normal arrangements they have with their banks
• _ mandatory clocks on machine displays, so people do not lose track of time. But most 
people have watches and they typically concentrate on the game.’
(Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 20).
11 Under the Interactive Gambling Act 2001 Australia has adopted a fence-sitting approach 
whereby certain forms of gambling by internet are legalised. This includes online wagering 
(racing, sports betting, and outcome of events) and lotteries and keno; with online gaming 
(poker, blackjack, baccarat, roulette and virtual EGMs prohibited) (PC, 2009, p. 12.3) On-
line contract for difference is also permitted but is regulated under financial services 
legislation. 
‘Gambling services prohibited under the IGA include:
• online casino games, like roulette, blackjack and all forms of online poker
• online versions of electronic gaming machines
• online bingo’ (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 15.6 citing the Interactive Gambling 
Act 2001.
12 The High Court in the Work Choices case held that the Commonwealth could validly use the 
corporations power.  See New South Wales v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 52.
13 In Australia’s federalist system, recent discussions on Commonwealth leadership include an 
expanding range of policy areas: health policy, water management, child protection and 
school curricula.
14 In 1999 the Australian Productivity Commission reported that Australia had nearly 180,000 
poker machines, more than half of which were in New South Wales. This figure represented 
21 per cent of all the gambling machines in the world, and on a per capita basis, Australia 
had roughly five times as many gaming machines as the United States.  Sourced at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Slot_machine.  Australia had 198,300 poker machines in 2009  
(Productivity Commission 2010, p. 6).
15 Estimates put this on average, at 40 per cent of gambling expenditure.
16 As pointed out by the Productivity Commission (2010, p.2.21): ‘While a smaller proportion 
of the population are playing EGMs than in the 1990s, the average EGM player today is 
spending more than was the case ten years ago (table 2.10). For instance, the average EGM 
player in Victoria was estimated to have spent around $1750 in 1999 (in today’s dollars), 
compared to $3100 in 2008.’.
17 The uncoordinated and ineffective research across jurisdictions was noted by the 
Productivity Commission (2010, p. 39); as was its ‘general concern in the lack of 
transparency of decision-making, inadequate consultation, and the tardy (or non) 
dissemination of information and research findings’.
18 The Productivity Commission (2009, p. 4.25) gave estimates within a range: ‘There are 
estimated to be between 90 000 and 170 000 Australian adults suffering significant problems 
from their gambling in a year (0.5 to 1.0 per cent of adults), and between 230 000 and 350 
000 people with moderate risks that may make them vulnerable to problem gambling (1.4 to 
2.1 per cent of adults)’. Whereas the final report estimated those categorised as ‘problem 
gamblers’ at around 115,000 people and those at ‘moderate risk’ at around 280,000 
(Productivity Commission, 2010, p. 2)
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19 Similar findings internationally are confirmed by Williams and Wood (2007) on Ontario data 
and in Nova Scotia where regular VLT players accounted for 94 per cent of revenue (Focal 
Research 2007, p. iii.).
20 As argued in the Productivity Commission Consumer Policy Framework report, there are 
ethical, social and fairness dimensions of consumer policy – ‘policies commonly put a 
premium on the interests of vulnerable and disadvantaged consumers even if this imposes 
some costs on other consumers’ (Fitzgerald et al 2008, p. 7).
21 Some of the ‘downside’ impacts related to community impact listed by IPPR in the UK 
(Harrison 2007, 1) include ‘increased problem gambling, mixed employment effects, 
displacement of existing businesses and spending, and damage to a city’s image’; the other 
studies cited above examine impacts including financial problems, family breakdown, 
suicide, crime, health system costs, work performance and so on.
22 Thomas et al (2009) (in Australia) found that ‘geo-temporal accessibility and a retreat from 
problems may encourage excessive gambling in some individuals’ and that accessibility is 
multi-dimensional and includes: ‘geo-temporal accessibility’ ‘(where ‘people preferred 
venues which were open long hours and located close to home, work or regular routes’,  
‘social and personal accessibility’ (where venues are seen as ‘safe, social, easy entertainment 
experiences’ in addition to ‘ accessible retreat from life issues’ and ‘financial accessibility’.  
In New Zealand Pearce et al (2008) found that ‘Neighbourhood access to opportunities for 
gambling is related to gambling and problem gambling behaviour, and contributes 
substantially to neighbourhood inequalities in gambling over and above individual level 
characteristics’.
23 This was recognised by the Productivity Commission (2010, p. 39): ‘Too weak a focus on 
consumer outcomes has led to the introduction of harm minimisation measures with little 
bite’.
24 http://www.greaterdandenong.com/Documents.asp?ID=1225&Title=Gambling+
25 A recent Melbourne example: ‘ACC chief executive John Lawler said that it had intelligence 
indicating organised crime groups were engaged in "high-level gambling activity" in legal 
casinos (Packham 2009) Available at:
http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/crown-casino-dole-scam/story-e6frf7jo-1225814006002
26 UnitingCare (2009, p. 51) ‘Gambling taxation is highly regressive in incidence, because 
lower income people generally gamble at greater rates than higher income people and so pay 
more gambling tax’.
27 This model builds on the work of the Ontario Problem Gambling Research Centre (OPGRC) 
Problem Gambling Pathways and Protective Factors Model (www.gamblingresearch.org)
and work conducted by Hancock and Hanrahan in the UK (2009).
28 The recent initiative led by Nick Xenophon and Pokies Watch, which requires EGM venues 
to restrict the sound and sight of machines in clubs and hotels from minors i.e., to protect 
vulnerable youth from sensitisation to gaming machines. ‘The ‘Don’t Gamble with your 
Kids’ campaign was designed to outlaw all advertising, promotions and play areas aimed at 
attracting children to gambling venues and called for venues to be radically redesigned to 
ensure children were not exposed to the sights or sounds of poker machine gambling.’ 
(Xenophon, 2010, at http://www.nickxenophon.com.au/media.php?id=88)
29 The Amalgamated Society of Engineers v The Adelaide Steamship Company Limited and 
Ors, 1920. 28 CLR 129; 1920 HCA, 54.
30 While the Productivity Commission estimates that gambling taxes ‘still amount to around 10 
per cent of state and territory own tax revenue’ (2010, p.6), any decline in reliance on 
gambling taxes is principally due to higher revenues from land and property taxes and not as 
a result of a conscious policy decision to reduce gambling tax revenue.
31 Back in 1999 the Productivity Commission clearly set out a range of negative impacts 
caused by gambling:  The PC outlined some of the dimensions of problem gambling and 
these are worthy of reiteration. They include:
• ‘Personal and psychological – control of spending, anxiety, depression, guilt, suicidal 
thoughts, escapism
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• Gambling behaviour per se – chasing losses, excessive spending, excessive time
• Interpersonal problems – family breakdown, loss of friends, loss of time with family
• Job or study problems – work or study performance, absenteeism, loss of employment or 
failure to progress in studies
• Financial impacts – bankruptcy, debt, financial hardship
• Legal problems, including criminal activity and its consequences’ (PC, 1999: 6.4).
32 One example was the NSW Tax Task Force 1988 estimate that ‘$75million of New South 
Wales tax expenditures in 1986/87 were attributable to gambling tax concessions, equal to 
13 per cent of gambling revenues that year’, mainly attributable to tax concessions to 
bookmakers costing $69.8 million; a cost which if applied nationally would have amounted 
to about $400 million in 1995/96. (Smith 2000, p. 125)
33 It would seem inappropriate for such a fund, intentioned for community benefits such as 
neighbourhood houses and gambler’s help services, to fund international delegates to a 
Victorian tourism conference (personal communication from committee Secretariat 2004).
34 To address this issue of intensity of play on EGMs, the Productivity Commission has 
recommended a bet limit of $1 per ‘button push’ on poker machines and a $20 maximum 
feed-in credit (being the amount of credit that can be inserted into a poker machine at any 
one time (currently up to $10,000) (PC 2010, p. 2).
35 Such a levy, across all forms of gambling, would be in addition to a single levy on racing, 
universally paid on a gross revenue basis which the Productivity Commission recommended 
should go towards funding the wagering industry; which has historically received support via 
special taxation arrangements. The PC report notes ‘tax revenue from racing is considerably 
lower than it was ten years ago’ (PC, 2010, p. 2.9).
36 In Victoria, EGM tax is set at one third of net revenue (including the GST component); with 
hotels paying an extra 8.3 per cent contributing to the Community Support Fund (from which 
clubs are exempt on the assumption of benefits to members and the community).
37 Allen Consulting (2009, p. 63), ‘Few industries pay as much of their revenues in taxation, 
with the possible exception of tobacco, alcohol and luxury cars’.
38 The UK National Lottery Commission is a ‘a non-departmental Public Body, sponsored by 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’, responsible for licensing, regulating and 
protecting the integrity of the National Lottery; protecting players; and maximising funds to 
good causes. To that end, the breakdown of funds for every £1 of sales is: ‘50p paid to 
winners in prizes; 28p given to good causes; 12p goes to the Government in Lottery duty; 5p 
paid to National Lottery retailers on all National Lottery tickets sold; and 5p retained by the 
operator to meet costs and returns to shareholders’. Available at: 
http://www.natlotcomm.gov.uk/CLIENT/content.ASP?ContentId=20.
It should be noted that the UK National Lottery operates not just in Britain but also in 
Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man; and must be distinguished from lotteries regulated by 
the Gambling Commission which are essentially small scale and local and apply only to 
England, Scotland and Wales. They do not pay tax and must pay 20p in every £1 to charity. 
There are also restrictions over the amount that can be offered as prizes and the amount that 
can be raised in a given year. ‘There is very good reason why small-scale lotteries are very 
limited in scope and scale in Great Britain. Lotteries are a peculiar form of pari mutuel 
betting by which it is potentially very easy to cheat people. The reason is that unlike betting 
with a bookie or in a casino it is quite impossible for players to check on the fairness for 
themselves’ (author communication with National Lottery Commission). These latter types 
of lottery are not the model recommended for a national Australian lottery; given that such 
lotteries make it difficult for the public to check on probity; they raise lower government 
taxes and lack the rigorous national monitoring afforded by the National Lottery 
Commission model.
39 Lottery West in Western Australia, funds a range of community initiatives: extending the 
capacity of not-for profits; strengthening community service delivery; participation in 
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community life; community development initiatives and valuing the state’s heritage. 
Available at: www.lotterywest.gov.au
40 Griffith, 2009, p. 18 in reference to payments for the 2009-10 financial year. 
41 The High Court of Australia, by a 5-2 majority, upheld the Commonwealth’s reliance on the 
corporations power. See: www.hcourt.gov.au/media/WorkChoicesdecision.pdf
42 ‘This is defined to be administrative in its mode of operation, pragmatic in orientation, 
concerned with the effective and rational management of human and other resources, and 
rich in policy goals and objectives. The States play a creative and proactive part but are, to a 
substantial degree, service providers whose performance is subject to continuous scrutiny 
and oversight. Typically, the financially dominant Commonwealth Government plays the 
manager’s role.’ (Griffith, 2009, p.i ).
‘ “(M)anagerial federalism”, where the financial power of the Commonwealth is used to 
guide and control the States toward what are considered to be non-ideological goals 
associated primarily with the effective management of resources. This is not to deny that the 
States remain significant players, in policy development as in other areas. Nor is to deny that 
the COAG process involves much needed and important reforms. It is only to state the 
obvious point that the underlying reality of Australian federalism remains the fiscal 
relationship between the Commonwealth and the States’ (Griffith, 2009, p. 28).
43 As reported by Griffith (2009, p. 15), the council has monitored progress against milestones 
agreed by COAG in 2007 on seven areas of competition and regulatory reform.
44 This would demand a change in the current principle that: ‘Each State’s share is calculated 
on the assumption that it and all the other States apply average policies and practices in 
delivering services and that they all make the same effort to raise revenue’ (Commonwealth 
Grants Commission 2008, p. 26).
45 ‘Overall, differences in the use and cost of State services have a bigger impact on the 
distribution of the pool than do differences in the capacity to raise revenue. The 
demographic, geographic and economic circumstances of each State drive the differences in 
revenue raising capacity and costs of providing services’ (Commonwealth Grants 
Commission, 2008, p. 5). 
‘The main drivers of differences in revenue raising capacity are mineral wealth, turnover in 
property markets, payrolls of medium and large businesses and land values. The main drivers 
of cost differences are Indigeneity, wage levels, scale of operation, population dispersion and 
other population characteristics’ (Commonwealth Grants Commission, 2008, p. 6). 
46 The Commission undertakes to advise Treasury on the distribution of the Goods and 
Services Tax (GST) revenue and health care grants (HCGs) which constitute ‘the pool’ 
(Commonwealth Grants Commission 2008, p. 2).
47 ‘The pool also provided 41 per cent of State budget revenues, with the percentages for 
individual States varying from 33 per cent for Western Australia to 74 per cent for the 
Northern Territory’ (Commonwealth Grants Commission 2008, p. 24).
48 www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/gambling-2009/submissions
49 On April 1, 2000, a new Federal Law on Games of Chance and Casinos (Bundesgesetz über 
Glücksspiele und Spielbanken, 1998) came into effect in Switzerland. This was aimed at 
improving the regulation and management of casino operations across the country.  The new 
law required active participation by casinos in the identification and prevention of problem 
gambling (Article 27), and required them to contribute to support services designed for the 
identification of and assistance to those involved in excessive gambling (Article 28) 
(Dombrowski 2002). (Also see http://www.admin.ch/ for information on Swiss legislation).
50 The New Zealand Gambling Act 2003 sections 308-312 imposes specific requirements on 
gambling providers in relation to identifying problem gamblers under Exclusion Standard 
Operating Procedures. Three means of identifying actual or potential problem gamblers 
include: casino staff’s use of the ‘casino signs’ for problem gambling’, third party 
notifications and self identification (Department of Internal Affairs 2007).
51 The Productivity Commission recommended (2010, p. 3) ‘There should be a progressive 
move over the next six years to full ‘pre-commitment’ systems that allow players to set 
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binding limits on their losses.
– Under a full system, there would be ‘safe’ default settings, with players able to
choose other limits (including no limit).
– In the interim, a partial system with non-binding limits would still yield benefits,
and provide lessons for implementing full pre-commitment.’. 
52 In 2009, Nova Scotia Gaming Corporation installed player tracking devices on 3000 gaming 
machines; enabling testing on real time player data. See: www.nsgc.ca/
53 Apart from South Australia’s Independent Gambling Authority, Victoria was the only state 
to implement the Productivity Commission’s 1999 recommendation on the need for 
independent research. Appointed by the Minister for Gambling, the 3-member Victorian 
Gambling Research Panel (GRP) was set up in 2000 with the brief of commissioning 
research on the social and economic impact of gambling and publicising research outcomes. 
Over its 3 years it commissioned some challenging research on EGM’s, regional caps, 
community impact, and the efficacy of self exclusion. It was abolished in December 2004 
when the government took gambling research in-house and ministerially-approved ready-to-
tender research to the value of approximately $1m, was abandoned. 
54 Allen Consulting (2009, p. 63), ‘Few industries pay as much of their revenues in taxation, 
with the possible exception of tobacco, alcohol and luxury cars’.
55 The Productivity Commission argues that cuts to gambling taxation were brokered to offset 
introduction of the GST; tax rates have been cut in the race wagering sector ‘such that tax 
revenue from racing is considerably lower than it was ten years ago’ (Productivity 
Commission, 2010, p. 2.9).
56 ‘Overall average casino rates are 24.1 per cent in the 2008 financial year, 24.5 per cent in the 
2010 financial year, 36.5 per cent in the 2012 financial year and 27.5 per cent in the 2017 
financial year. These averages assume normalised net revenue of $541.4 million in the 2007 
financial year and no indexation of the tax bands’ (Tabcorp Holdings Limited 2007a cited by 
Allen Consulting 2009, p. 66).
57 However Allen Consulting (2009, p. 77) argues ‘Comparisons between casinos and other 
gambling modes should not be made solely on the basis of tax rates. Rather, comparisons 
should consider the full range of financial transfers from casinos to government, including 
taxes, licence fees and community benefit levies’.
